[<prev month] [next month>] [year] [list]
kernel-hardening mailing list - 2016/06
Messages by day:
June 1 (1 message)
June 3 (8 messages)
June 4 (2 messages)
June 6 (4 messages)
June 7 (13 messages)
June 8 (11 messages)
June 9 (15 messages)
June 10 (5 messages)
June 11 (4 messages)
June 12 (2 messages)
June 13 (13 messages)
June 14 (10 messages)
June 15 (13 messages)
June 16 (46 messages)
- Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu)
- Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>)
- [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 02/13] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 01/13] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable() (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 03/13] x86/cpa: Warn if kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd is used inappropriately (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in pages instead of number of stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 05/13] mm: Move memcg stack accounting to account_kernel_stack (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 07/13] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 09/13] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 11/13] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 13/13] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- Re: [PATCH 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (Mika Penttilä <mika.penttila@...tfour.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in pages instead of
number of stacks (Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@...tuozzo.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 09/13] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to
OOPS, start with regs->sp (Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>)
- Re: Re: [PATCH 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped
stacks (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
- Initialising random(4) (Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@...il.com>)
- Re: Initialising random(4) (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in pages instead of
number of stacks (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in pages instead of
number of stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: Initialising random(4) (Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in pages instead of
number of stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: Initialising random(4) (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack
before do_exit (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack
before do_exit (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on
stack overflow (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on
stack overflow (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on
stack overflow (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on
stack overflow (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on
stack overflow (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in pages instead of
number of stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in pages instead of
number of stacks (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further
restriction of perf_event_open (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu)
June 17 (33 messages)
- Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 0/4] mm: Hardened usercopy (Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu)
- Re: Initialising random(4) (Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@...ibm.com>)
- Re: [RFC v1 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory
sections (x86_64) (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
- Re: [RFC v1 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory
sections (x86_64) (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
- Re: [RFC v1 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory
sections (x86_64) (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of
perf_event_open (Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>)
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open (Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further
restriction of perf_event_open (Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>)
- Re: Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further
restriction of perf_event_open (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further
restriction of perf_event_open (Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- [PATCH v2 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v2 01/13] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable() (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v2 02/13] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v2 03/13] x86/cpa: Warn if kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd is used inappropriately (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v2 05/13] mm: Move memcg stack accounting to account_kernel_stack (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v2 07/13] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v2 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v2 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v2 08/13] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v2 09/13] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v2 10/13] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v2 11/13] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v2 12/13] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v2 13/13] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further
restriction of perf_event_open (Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v2 03/13] x86/cpa: Warn if kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd is
used inappropriately (Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>)
- Re: [PATCH v2 05/13] mm: Move memcg stack accounting to
account_kernel_stack (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v2 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v2 05/13] mm: Move memcg stack accounting to account_kernel_stack (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v2 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
June 18 (7 messages)
June 19 (1 message)
June 20 (27 messages)
June 21 (28 messages)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v2 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of
number of stacks (Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@...tuozzo.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 03/13] x86/mm: Remove kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd() and
efi_cleanup_page_tables() (Matt Fleming <matt@...eblueprint.co.uk>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 05/13] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page
stacks (Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@...tuozzo.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v4 2/4] Add the latent_entropy gcc plugin (Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v4 2/4] Add the latent_entropy gcc plugin (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v2 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks
with guard pages (x86, core) (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
- Re: Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks
with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks
with guard pages (x86, core) (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
- Re: Re: [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic
vmalloced stack support (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v4 0/4] Introduce the latent_entropy gcc plugin (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: Re: [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>)
- Re: Re: [PATCH v3 06/13] fork: Add generic
vmalloced stack support (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
June 22 (15 messages)
June 23 (30 messages)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address
KASLR (Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR (Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR (Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address
KASLR (Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address
KASLR (Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net>)
June 24 (54 messages)
- Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address
KASLR (Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net>)
- [PATCH v4 00/16] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 01/16] bluetooth: Switch SMP to crypto_cipher_encrypt_one() (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 02/16] rxrpc: Avoid using stack memory in SG lists in rxkad (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 03/16] x86/mm/hotplug: Don't remove PGD entries in remove_pagetable() (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 04/16] x86/cpa: In populate_pgd, don't set the pgd entry until it's populated (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 05/16] x86/mm: Remove kernel_unmap_pages_in_pgd() and efi_cleanup_page_tables() (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 06/16] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of number of stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 07/16] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 08/16] dma-api: Teach the "DMA-from-stack" check about vmapped stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 09/16] fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 15/16] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 10/16] x86/die: Don't try to recover from an OOPS on a non-default stack (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack before do_exit (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 13/16] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace on stack overflow (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 12/16] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to OOPS, start with regs->sp (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 14/16] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing the "Stack:" part of an OOPS (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH v4 16/16] x86/mm: Improve stack-overflow #PF handling (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v4 01/16] bluetooth: Switch SMP to
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one() (Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>)
- Re: [PATCH v4 01/16] bluetooth: Switch SMP to
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one() (Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm: memory area address KASLR (Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Michal Hocko <mhocko@...nel.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v4 06/16] mm: Track NR_KERNEL_STACK in KiB instead of
number of stacks (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v4 07/16] mm: Fix memcg stack accounting for sub-page
stacks (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack
before do_exit (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v4 12/16] x86/dumpstack: When dumping stack bytes due to
OOPS, start with regs->sp (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v4 13/16] x86/dumpstack: Try harder to get a call trace
on stack overflow (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v4 14/16] x86/dumpstack/64: Handle faults when printing
the "Stack:" part of an OOPS (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack
before do_exit (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- devicetree random-seed properties, was: "Re: [PATCH v7 0/9] x86/mm:
memory area address KASLR" (Jason Cooper <jason@...edaemon.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: devicetree random-seed properties, was: "Re: [PATCH v7 0/9]
x86/mm: memory area address KASLR" (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v4 11/16] x86/dumpstack: When OOPSing, rewind the stack
before do_exit (Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages
(x86, core) (Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>)
- Re: devicetree random-seed properties, was: "Re: [PATCH v7 0/9]
x86/mm: memory area address KASLR" (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 6/4] mm: disallow user copy to/from separately
allocated pages (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 6/4] mm: disallow user copy to/from separately
allocated pages (Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>)
- Re: [RFC][PATCH v2 6/4] mm: disallow user copy to/from separately
allocated pages (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86,
core) (Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v3 00/13] Virtually mapped stacks with guard pages (x86, core) (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
June 25 (7 messages)
June 26 (40 messages)
June 27 (22 messages)
June 28 (39 messages)
June 29 (9 messages)
June 30 (5 messages)
464 messages
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.