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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLA38thQAa6Uj0YCFvwGgus2a21GaFsD8PcD1ZvhS+Wkg@mail.gmail.com> Date: Fri, 6 May 2016 08:31:29 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Yinghai Lu <yinghai@...nel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@...aani.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 10/11] x86/KASLR: Add physical address randomization >4G On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 1:27 AM, Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com> wrote: > Hi Kees, > > On 05/05/16 at 03:13pm, Kees Cook wrote: >> From: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com> >> >> This patch exchanges the prior slots[] array for the new slot_areas[] >> array, and lifts the limitation of KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE on the physical >> address offset for 64-bit. As before, process_e820_entry() walks > > Sorry, I didn't get what you said about lifting the limitation for > 64-bit. Do you mean 32-bit? Prior to this patch, physical address randomization was limited to KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE on x86_64. After this patch, that limit is lifted for x86_64 but 32-bit remains limited to KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE being the upper physical memory position. > > Thanks > Baoquan > > >> memory and populates slot_areas[], splitting on any detected mem_avoid >> collisions. >> >> Finally, since the slots[] array and its associated functions are not >> needed any more, so they are removed. >> >> Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com> >> [kees: rewrote changelog, refactored goto into while] >> [kees: limit 32-bit to KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE] >> [kees: squash dead-code removal into this patch] >> [kees: refactored to use new mem_overlap code, renamed variables] >> [kees: updated Kconfig to reflect updated implementation] >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> >> --- >> arch/x86/Kconfig | 27 +++++---- >> arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- >> 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig >> index 5892d549596d..39be0f7b49ef 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig >> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig >> @@ -1943,21 +1943,26 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE >> attempts relying on knowledge of the location of kernel >> code internals. >> >> - The kernel physical and virtual address can be randomized >> - from 16MB up to 1GB on 64-bit and 512MB on 32-bit. (Note that >> - using RANDOMIZE_BASE reduces the memory space available to >> - kernel modules from 1.5GB to 1GB.) >> + On 64-bit, the kernel physical and virtual addresses are >> + randomized separately. The physical address will be anywhere >> + between 16MB and the top of physical memory (up to 64TB). The >> + virtual address will be randomized from 16MB up to 1GB (9 bits >> + of entropy). Note that this also reduces the memory space >> + available to kernel modules from 1.5GB to 1GB. >> + >> + On 32-bit, the kernel physical and virtual addresses are >> + randomized together. They will be randomized from 16MB up to >> + 512MB (8 bits of entropy). >> >> Entropy is generated using the RDRAND instruction if it is >> supported. If RDTSC is supported, its value is mixed into >> the entropy pool as well. If neither RDRAND nor RDTSC are >> - supported, then entropy is read from the i8254 timer. >> - >> - Since the kernel is built using 2GB addressing, and >> - PHYSICAL_ALIGN must be at a minimum of 2MB, only 10 bits of >> - entropy is theoretically possible. Currently, with the >> - default value for PHYSICAL_ALIGN and due to page table >> - layouts, 64-bit uses 9 bits of entropy and 32-bit uses 8 bits. >> + supported, then entropy is read from the i8254 timer. The >> + usable entropy is limited by the kernel being built using >> + 2GB addressing, and that PHYSICAL_ALIGN must be at a >> + minimum of 2MB. As a result, only 10 bits of entropy is >> + theoretically possible, but the implementations are further >> + limited due to memory layouts. >> >> If CONFIG_HIBERNATE is also enabled, KASLR is disabled at boot >> time. To enable it, boot with "kaslr" on the kernel command >> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c >> index 58d0871be037..8cf705826bdc 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c >> @@ -125,17 +125,6 @@ struct mem_vector { >> #define MEM_AVOID_MAX 4 >> static struct mem_vector mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MAX]; >> >> -static bool mem_contains(struct mem_vector *region, struct mem_vector *item) >> -{ >> - /* Item at least partially before region. */ >> - if (item->start < region->start) >> - return false; >> - /* Item at least partially after region. */ >> - if (item->start + item->size > region->start + region->size) >> - return false; >> - return true; >> -} >> - >> static bool mem_overlaps(struct mem_vector *one, struct mem_vector *two) >> { >> /* Item one is entirely before item two. */ >> @@ -286,8 +275,6 @@ static bool mem_avoid_overlap(struct mem_vector *img, >> return is_overlapping; >> } >> >> -static unsigned long slots[KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN]; >> - >> struct slot_area { >> unsigned long addr; >> int num; >> @@ -318,36 +305,44 @@ static void store_slot_info(struct mem_vector *region, unsigned long image_size) >> } >> } >> >> -static void slots_append(unsigned long addr) >> -{ >> - /* Overflowing the slots list should be impossible. */ >> - if (slot_max >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN) >> - return; >> - >> - slots[slot_max++] = addr; >> -} >> - >> static unsigned long slots_fetch_random(void) >> { >> + unsigned long slot; >> + int i; >> + >> /* Handle case of no slots stored. */ >> if (slot_max == 0) >> return 0; >> >> - return slots[get_random_long("Physical") % slot_max]; >> + slot = get_random_long("Physical") % slot_max; >> + >> + for (i = 0; i < slot_area_index; i++) { >> + if (slot >= slot_areas[i].num) { >> + slot -= slot_areas[i].num; >> + continue; >> + } >> + return slot_areas[i].addr + slot * CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN; >> + } >> + >> + if (i == slot_area_index) >> + debug_putstr("slots_fetch_random() failed!?\n"); >> + return 0; >> } >> >> static void process_e820_entry(struct e820entry *entry, >> unsigned long minimum, >> unsigned long image_size) >> { >> - struct mem_vector region, img, overlap; >> + struct mem_vector region, overlap; >> + struct slot_area slot_area; >> + unsigned long start_orig; >> >> /* Skip non-RAM entries. */ >> if (entry->type != E820_RAM) >> return; >> >> - /* Ignore entries entirely above our maximum. */ >> - if (entry->addr >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE) >> + /* On 32-bit, ignore entries entirely above our maximum. */ >> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) && entry->addr >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE) >> return; Since physical and virtual are not separated on 32-bit, it means the 32-bit physical address selection becomes the virtual address selection, and as such, it cannot be above KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE on 32-bit. -Kees >> >> /* Ignore entries entirely below our minimum. */ >> @@ -357,31 +352,55 @@ static void process_e820_entry(struct e820entry *entry, >> region.start = entry->addr; >> region.size = entry->size; >> >> - /* Potentially raise address to minimum location. */ >> - if (region.start < minimum) >> - region.start = minimum; >> + /* Give up if slot area array is full. */ >> + while (slot_area_index < MAX_SLOT_AREA) { >> + start_orig = region.start; >> >> - /* Potentially raise address to meet alignment requirements. */ >> - region.start = ALIGN(region.start, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN); >> + /* Potentially raise address to minimum location. */ >> + if (region.start < minimum) >> + region.start = minimum; >> >> - /* Did we raise the address above the bounds of this e820 region? */ >> - if (region.start > entry->addr + entry->size) >> - return; >> + /* Potentially raise address to meet alignment needs. */ >> + region.start = ALIGN(region.start, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN); >> >> - /* Reduce size by any delta from the original address. */ >> - region.size -= region.start - entry->addr; >> + /* Did we raise the address above this e820 region? */ >> + if (region.start > entry->addr + entry->size) >> + return; >> >> - /* Reduce maximum size to fit end of image within maximum limit. */ >> - if (region.start + region.size > KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE) >> - region.size = KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - region.start; >> + /* Reduce size by any delta from the original address. */ >> + region.size -= region.start - start_orig; >> >> - /* Walk each aligned slot and check for avoided areas. */ >> - for (img.start = region.start, img.size = image_size ; >> - mem_contains(®ion, &img) ; >> - img.start += CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN) { >> - if (mem_avoid_overlap(&img, &overlap)) >> - continue; >> - slots_append(img.start); >> + /* On 32-bit, reduce region size to fit within max size. */ >> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) && >> + region.start + region.size > KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE) >> + region.size = KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - region.start; >> + >> + /* Return if region can't contain decompressed kernel */ >> + if (region.size < image_size) >> + return; >> + >> + /* If nothing overlaps, store the region and return. */ >> + if (!mem_avoid_overlap(®ion, &overlap)) { >> + store_slot_info(®ion, image_size); >> + return; >> + } >> + >> + /* Store beginning of region if holds at least image_size. */ >> + if (overlap.start > region.start + image_size) { >> + struct mem_vector beginning; >> + >> + beginning.start = region.start; >> + beginning.size = overlap.start - region.start; >> + store_slot_info(&beginning, image_size); >> + } >> + >> + /* Return if overlap extends to or past end of region. */ >> + if (overlap.start + overlap.size >= region.start + region.size) >> + return; >> + >> + /* Clip off the overlapping region and start over. */ >> + region.size -= overlap.start - region.start + overlap.size; >> + region.start = overlap.start + overlap.size; >> } >> } >> >> @@ -398,6 +417,10 @@ static unsigned long find_random_phys_addr(unsigned long minimum, >> for (i = 0; i < boot_params->e820_entries; i++) { >> process_e820_entry(&boot_params->e820_map[i], minimum, >> image_size); >> + if (slot_area_index == MAX_SLOT_AREA) { >> + debug_putstr("Aborted e820 scan (slot_areas full)!\n"); >> + break; >> + } >> } >> >> return slots_fetch_random(); >> -- >> 2.6.3 >> -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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