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Message-ID: <CAJcbSZGSFOQjxbFETA=Zj6g2pRJeyzMBwPGB691AOoCp7VAr3Q@mail.gmail.com> Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2016 12:52:30 -0700 From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> To: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Greg Thelen <gthelen@...gle.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization I agree, if we had a generic way to pass entropy across boots on all architecture that would be amazing. I will let the SLAB maintainers to decide on requiring CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM or documenting it. On Mon, Apr 18, 2016 at 12:36 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> wrote: > On 04/18/2016 08:59 AM, Thomas Garnier wrote: >> >> I will send the next version today. Note that I get_random_bytes_arch >> is used because at that stage we have 0 bits of entropy. It seemed >> like a better idea to use the arch version that will fallback on >> get_random_bytes sub API in the worse case. >> > > This is unfortunate for ARM/ARM64. Those platforms don't have a standard > method for getting random numbers so until additional entropy is added > get_random_bytes will always return the same seed and indeed I always > see the same shuffle on a quick test of arm64. For KASLR, the workaround > was to require the bootloader to pass in entropy. It might be good to > either document this or require this only be used with CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM. > > > >> On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 3:47 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> >> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks for the comments. I will address them in a v2 early next week. >>> >>> If anyone has other comments, please let me know. >>> >>> Thomas >>> >>> On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 3:26 PM, Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 15:00 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, 15 Apr 2016 10:25:59 -0700 Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Provide an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the >>>>>> SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new >>>>>> set >>>>>> of pages. The order on different freelist sizes is pre-computed at >>>>>> boot >>>>>> for performance. This security feature reduces the predictability of >>>>>> the >>>>>> kernel SLAB allocator against heap overflows rendering attacks much >>>>>> less >>>>>> stable. >>>> >>>> >>>> trivia: >>>> >>>>>> @@ -1229,6 +1229,61 @@ static void __init set_up_node(struct >>>>>> kmem_cache *cachep, int index) >>>> >>>> [] >>>>>> >>>>>> + */ >>>>>> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_2[2]; >>>>>> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_4[4]; >>>>>> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_8[8]; >>>>>> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_16[16]; >>>>>> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_32[32]; >>>>>> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_64[64]; >>>>>> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_128[128]; >>>>>> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_256[256]; >>>>>> +static struct m_list { >>>>>> + size_t count; >>>>>> + freelist_idx_t *list; >>>>>> +} master_lists[] = { >>>>>> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_2), master_list_2 }, >>>>>> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_4), master_list_4 }, >>>>>> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_8), master_list_8 }, >>>>>> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_16), master_list_16 }, >>>>>> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_32), master_list_32 }, >>>>>> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_64), master_list_64 }, >>>>>> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_128), master_list_128 }, >>>>>> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_256), master_list_256 }, >>>>>> +}; >>>> >>>> >>>> static const struct m_list? >>>> >
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