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Message-ID: <CAOp4FwTc6C=E2fynp85tVWrZpthMvFpJFmV=HG+czHH_D41OXA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2016 05:03:10 +0000
From: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@...il.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@...hat.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@...gle.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>, Jeff Dike <jdike@...toit.com>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com>, Michael Kerrisk <mtk@...7.org>, Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC v1 00/17] seccomp-object: From attack
surface reduction to sandboxing
On Thu, Mar 24, 2016 at 4:24 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 23, 2016 at 6:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> This series is a proof of concept (not ready for production) to extend seccomp
>> with the ability to check argument pointers of syscalls as kernel object (e.g.
>> file path). This add a needed feature to create a full sandbox managed by
>> userland like the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or the OpenBSD Pledge. It was initially
>> inspired from a partial seccomp-LSM prototype [1] but has evolved a lot since :)
>
> This is interesting! I'd really like to get argument inspection
> working. I'm going to spend some time examining this series more
> closely, but my initial reaction is that I'm suspicious of the ToCToU
> checking -- I'd rather there be no race at all. As for the bug-fixes,
> I'll get those pulled in now. Thanks!
>
Personally, I love the OpenBSD pledge() mechanism. It makes it so easy
to apply attack surface reduction. If seccomp moves closer to pledge,
that would be great.
See here:
https://github.com/dimkr/libwaive
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