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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jL2MJkJS8H7Gxbtw1P+FREa2XgF_7xkVMgqSvGXRLWAJw@mail.gmail.com> Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2016 20:46:52 -0800 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>, Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, linux-pm@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCHv2 2/2] mm/page_poisoning.c: Allow for zero poisoning On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 6:38 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org> wrote: > By default, page poisoning uses a poison value (0xaa) on free. If this > is changed to 0, the page is not only sanitized but zeroing on alloc > with __GFP_ZERO can be skipped as well. The tradeoff is that detecting > corruption from the poisoning is harder to detect. This feature also > cannot be used with hibernation since pages are not guaranteed to be > zeroed after hibernation. > > Credit to Grsecurity/PaX team for inspiring this work > > Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org> > --- > include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++ > include/linux/poison.h | 4 ++++ > kernel/power/hibernate.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ > mm/Kconfig.debug | 14 ++++++++++++++ > mm/page_alloc.c | 11 ++++++++++- > mm/page_ext.c | 10 ++++++++-- > mm/page_poison.c | 7 +++++-- > 7 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h > index 966bf0e..59ce0dc 100644 > --- a/include/linux/mm.h > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h > @@ -2177,10 +2177,12 @@ extern int apply_to_page_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, > #ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING > extern bool page_poisoning_enabled(void); > extern void kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable); > +extern bool page_is_poisoned(struct page *page); > #else > static inline bool page_poisoning_enabled(void) { return false; } > static inline void kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, > int enable) { } > +static inline bool page_is_poisoned(struct page *page) { return false; } > #endif > > #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC > diff --git a/include/linux/poison.h b/include/linux/poison.h > index 4a27153..51334ed 100644 > --- a/include/linux/poison.h > +++ b/include/linux/poison.h > @@ -30,7 +30,11 @@ > #define TIMER_ENTRY_STATIC ((void *) 0x300 + POISON_POINTER_DELTA) > > /********** mm/debug-pagealloc.c **********/ > +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO > +#define PAGE_POISON 0x00 > +#else > #define PAGE_POISON 0xaa > +#endif > > /********** mm/page_alloc.c ************/ > > diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c > index b7342a2..aa0f26b 100644 > --- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c > +++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c > @@ -1158,6 +1158,22 @@ static int __init kaslr_nohibernate_setup(char *str) > return nohibernate_setup(str); > } > > +static int __init page_poison_nohibernate_setup(char *str) > +{ > +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO > + /* > + * The zeroing option for page poison skips the checks on alloc. > + * since hibernation doesn't save free pages there's no way to > + * guarantee the pages will still be zeroed. > + */ > + if (!strcmp(str, "on")) { > + pr_info("Disabling hibernation due to page poisoning\n"); > + return nohibernate_setup(str); > + } > +#endif > + return 1; > +} > + > __setup("noresume", noresume_setup); > __setup("resume_offset=", resume_offset_setup); > __setup("resume=", resume_setup); > @@ -1166,3 +1182,4 @@ __setup("resumewait", resumewait_setup); > __setup("resumedelay=", resumedelay_setup); > __setup("nohibernate", nohibernate_setup); > __setup("kaslr", kaslr_nohibernate_setup); > +__setup("page_poison=", page_poison_nohibernate_setup); > diff --git a/mm/Kconfig.debug b/mm/Kconfig.debug > index 25c98ae..3d3b954 100644 > --- a/mm/Kconfig.debug > +++ b/mm/Kconfig.debug > @@ -48,3 +48,17 @@ config PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY > > If you are only interested in sanitization, say Y. Otherwise > say N. > + > +config PAGE_POISONING_ZERO > + bool "Use zero for poisoning instead of random data" > + depends on PAGE_POISONING > + ---help--- > + Instead of using the existing poison value, fill the pages with > + zeros. This makes it harder to detect when errors are occurring > + due to sanitization but the zeroing at free means that it is > + no longer necessary to write zeros when GFP_ZERO is used on > + allocation. May be worth noting the security benefit in this help text. > + > + Enabling page poisoning with this option will disable hibernation This isn't obvious to me. It looks like you need to both use CONFIG_PAGE_POISOING_ZERO and put "page_poison=on" on the command line to enable it? -Kees > + > + If unsure, say N > diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c > index cc4762a..59bd9dc 100644 > --- a/mm/page_alloc.c > +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c > @@ -1382,15 +1382,24 @@ static inline int check_new_page(struct page *page) > return 0; > } > > +static inline bool free_pages_prezeroed(bool poisoned) > +{ > + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) && > + page_poisoning_enabled() && poisoned; > +} > + > static int prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags, > int alloc_flags) > { > int i; > + bool poisoned = true; > > for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) { > struct page *p = page + i; > if (unlikely(check_new_page(p))) > return 1; > + if (poisoned) > + poisoned &= page_is_poisoned(p); > } > > set_page_private(page, 0); > @@ -1401,7 +1410,7 @@ static int prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags, > kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order, 1); > kasan_alloc_pages(page, order); > > - if (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO) > + if (!free_pages_prezeroed(poisoned) && (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO)) > for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) > clear_highpage(page + i); > > diff --git a/mm/page_ext.c b/mm/page_ext.c > index 292ca7b..2d864e6 100644 > --- a/mm/page_ext.c > +++ b/mm/page_ext.c > @@ -106,12 +106,15 @@ struct page_ext *lookup_page_ext(struct page *page) > struct page_ext *base; > > base = NODE_DATA(page_to_nid(page))->node_page_ext; > -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM > +#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_VM) || defined(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING) > /* > * The sanity checks the page allocator does upon freeing a > * page can reach here before the page_ext arrays are > * allocated when feeding a range of pages to the allocator > * for the first time during bootup or memory hotplug. > + * > + * This check is also necessary for ensuring page poisoning > + * works as expected when enabled > */ > if (unlikely(!base)) > return NULL; > @@ -180,12 +183,15 @@ struct page_ext *lookup_page_ext(struct page *page) > { > unsigned long pfn = page_to_pfn(page); > struct mem_section *section = __pfn_to_section(pfn); > -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM > +#if defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_VM) || defined(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING) > /* > * The sanity checks the page allocator does upon freeing a > * page can reach here before the page_ext arrays are > * allocated when feeding a range of pages to the allocator > * for the first time during bootup or memory hotplug. > + * > + * This check is also necessary for ensuring page poisoning > + * works as expected when enabled > */ > if (!section->page_ext) > return NULL; > diff --git a/mm/page_poison.c b/mm/page_poison.c > index 89d3bc7..479e7ea 100644 > --- a/mm/page_poison.c > +++ b/mm/page_poison.c > @@ -71,11 +71,14 @@ static inline void clear_page_poison(struct page *page) > __clear_bit(PAGE_EXT_DEBUG_POISON, &page_ext->flags); > } > > -static inline bool page_poison(struct page *page) > +bool page_is_poisoned(struct page *page) > { > struct page_ext *page_ext; > > page_ext = lookup_page_ext(page); > + if (!page_ext) > + return false; > + > return test_bit(PAGE_EXT_DEBUG_POISON, &page_ext->flags); > } > > @@ -137,7 +140,7 @@ static void unpoison_page(struct page *page) > { > void *addr; > > - if (!page_poison(page)) > + if (!page_is_poisoned(page)) > return; > > addr = kmap_atomic(page); > -- > 2.5.0 > -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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