|
Message-ID: <56A6CCE8.5030600@redhat.com> Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 17:33:28 -0800 From: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> Cc: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 3/3] mm/page_poisoning.c: Allow for zero poisoning On 01/25/2016 02:05 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 12:16 PM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote: >> Thanks for doing this! It all looks pretty straightforward. >> >> On 01/25/2016 08:55 AM, Laura Abbott wrote: >>> By default, page poisoning uses a poison value (0xaa) on free. If this >>> is changed to 0, the page is not only sanitized but zeroing on alloc >>> with __GFP_ZERO can be skipped as well. The tradeoff is that detecting >>> corruption from the poisoning is harder to detect. This feature also >>> cannot be used with hibernation since pages are not guaranteed to be >>> zeroed after hibernation. >> >> Ugh, that's a good point about hibernation. I'm not sure how widely it >> gets used but it does look pretty widely enabled in distribution kernels. >> >> Is this something that's fixable? It seems like we could have the >> hibernation code run through and zero all the free lists. Or, we could >> just disable the optimization at runtime when a hibernation is done. > > We can also make hibernation run-time disabled when poisoning is used > (similar to how kASLR disables it). > I'll look into the approach kASLR uses to disable hibernation although having the hibernation code zero the memory could be useful as well. We can see if there are actual complaints. >> Not that we _have_ to do any of this now, but if a runtime knob (like a >> sysctl) could be fun too. I would be nice for folks to turn it on and >> off if they wanted the added security of "real" poisoning vs. the >> potential performance boost from this optimization. >> >>> +static inline bool should_zero(void) >>> +{ >>> + return !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) || >>> + !page_poisoning_enabled(); >>> +} >> >> I wonder if calling this "free_pages_prezeroed()" would make things a >> bit more clear when we use it in prep_new_page(). >> Yes that sounds much better >>> static int prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags, >>> int alloc_flags) >>> { >>> @@ -1401,7 +1407,7 @@ static int prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags, >>> kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 1); >>> kasan_alloc_pages(page, order); >>> >>> - if (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO) >>> + if (should_zero() && gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO) >>> for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) >>> clear_highpage(page + i); >> >> It's probably also worth pointing out that this can be a really nice >> feature to have in virtual machines where memory is being deduplicated. >> As it stands now, the free lists end up with gunk in them and tend not >> to be easy to deduplicate. This patch would fix that. Interesting, do you have any benchmarks I could test? > > Oh, good point! > > -Kees >
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.