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Message-ID: <20160126171523.GA13715@ubuntumail>
Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2016 17:15:23 +0000
From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>,
Robert Święcki <robert@...ecki.net>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...e.cz>,
Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH 0/2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER
to be disabled
Quoting Josh Boyer (jwboyer@...oraproject.org):
> On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 11:57 PM, Eric W. Biederman
> <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
> > Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> writes:
> >
> >> On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 11:33 AM, Eric W. Biederman
> >> <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
> >>> Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> writes:
> >>>>
> >>>> Well, I don't know about less weird, but it would leave a unneeded
> >>>> hole in the permission checks.
> >>>
> >>> To be clear the current patch has my:
> >>>
> >>> Nacked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
> >>>
> >>> The code is buggy, and poorly thought through. Your lack of interest in
> >>> fixing the bugs in your patch is distressing.
> >>
> >> I'm not sure where you see me having a "lack of interest". The
> >> existing cap-checking sysctls have a corner-case bug, which is
> >> orthogonal to this change.
> >
> > That certainly doesn't sound like you have any plans to change anything
> > there.
> >
> >>> So broken code, not willing to fix. No. We are not merging this sysctl.
> >>
> >> I think you're jumping to conclusions. :)
> >
> > I think I am the maintainer.
> >
> > What you are proposing is very much something that is only of interst to
> > people who are not using user namespaces. It is fatally flawed as
> > a way to avoid new attack surfaces for people who don't care as the
> > sysctl leaves user namespaces enabled by default. It is fatally flawed
> > as remediation to recommend to people to change if a new user namespace
> > related but is discovered. Any running process that happens to be
> > created while user namespace creation was enabled will continue to
> > exist. Effectively a reboot will be required as part of a mitigation.
> > Many sysadmins will get that wrong.
> >
> > I can't possibly see your sysctl as proposed achieving it's goals. A
> > person has to be entirely too aware of subtlety and nuance to use it
> > effectively.
>
> What you're saying is true for the "oh crap" case of a new userns
> related CVE being found. However, there is the case where sysadmins
> know for a fact that a set of machines should not allow user
> namespaces to be enabled. Currently they have 2 choices, 1) use their
Hi - can you give a specific example of this? (Where users really should
not be able to use them - not where they might not need them) I think
it'll help the discussion tremendously. Because so far the only good
arguments I've seen have been about actual bugs in the user namespaces,
which would not warrant a designed-in permanent disable switch. If
there are good use cases where such a disable switch will always be
needed (and compiling out can't satisfy) that'd be helpful.
thanks,
-serge
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