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Message-Id: <1453502345-30416-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 14:39:03 -0800 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Robert Święcki <robert@...ecki.net>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...e.cz>, Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH 0/2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER to be disabled There continues to be unexpected side-effects and security exposures via CLONE_NEWUSER. For many end-users running distro kernels with CONFIG_USER_NS enabled, there is no way to disable this feature when desired. As such, this creates a sysctl to restrict CLONE_NEWUSER so admins not running containers or Chrome can avoid the risks of this feature. -Kees
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