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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKbghS7e0sxRt1hEnancaNo-rXQAJrM_NKUwpivFs6sSw@mail.gmail.com> Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 13:23:23 -0800 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com> Cc: Daniel Sangorrin <daniel.sangorrin@...hiba.co.jp>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] seccomp: provide information about the previous syscall On Fri, Jan 22, 2016 at 9:30 AM, Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com> wrote: > On Fri, Jan 22, 2016 at 03:30:00PM +0900, Daniel Sangorrin wrote: >> This patch allows applications to restrict the order in which >> its system calls may be requested. In order to do that, we >> provide seccomp-BPF scripts with information about the >> previous system call requested. >> >> An example use case consists of detecting (and stopping) return >> oriented attacks that disturb the normal execution flow of >> a user program. >> >> Signed-off-by: Daniel Sangorrin <daniel.sangorrin@...hiba.co.jp> > ... >> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h > ... >> struct seccomp_data { >> int nr; >> + int prev_nr; >> __u32 arch; >> __u64 instruction_pointer; >> __u64 args[6]; > > this will break abi for existing seccomp programs. > New field has to be at the end. Yeah, and if we break abi, we need to add further sanity checking to the parser to determine which "version" of seccomp_data we need. I'm not convinced that there is enough utility here to break ABI. (Though if we do, I'd like to add tid to the seccomp_data, which has been requested in the past to make some pid-based arg checks easier to do.) -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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