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Message-ID: <56A28029.2060608@labbott.name>
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 11:16:57 -0800
From: Laura Abbott <laura@...bott.name>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>, Thomas Gleixner
<tglx@...utronix.de>, x86@...nel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only
memory
On 1/22/16 9:19 AM, David Brown wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 19, 2016 at 10:08:34AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>
>> This introduces __ro_after_init as a way to mark such memory, and uses
>> it on the x86 vDSO to kill an extant kernel exploitation method. Also
>> adds a new kernel parameter to help debug future use and adds an lkdtm
>> test to check the results.
>
> I've tested these patches on 32-bit ARM using the provoke-crashes
> test. However, they do require CONFIG_ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS to be enabled
> as well, which does incur additional memory usage.
>
> Do we want to consider making CONFIG_ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS default y for
> security reasons, and just document that memory-constrained systems
> may want to turn it off?
>
> I'll test the arm64 next.
>
> David
Kees had previously pushed a patch to do so but it exposed a couple of
underlying issues, mostly with low power paths
(c.f. http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.ports.arm.kernel/471199,
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.mm/143489)
Those will need to be all fixed up before this could be made default.
Thanks,
Laura
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