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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLKBD=CUPR7mHspzS6Oy99C+gXq+sLnHSbCJT6hXQGOXg@mail.gmail.com> Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 12:15:56 -0800 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at> Cc: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: Re: status: GRKERNSEC_BRUTE On Sun, Nov 29, 2015 at 2:54 PM, Richard Weinberger <richard@....at> wrote: > Am 24.11.2015 um 20:19 schrieb Kees Cook: >> Hi, >> >> While not strictly a _kernel_ self-protection mechanism, it's still >> something that I'd love to see upstream, so I'll ping about its status >> here too. :) Any updates on the brute force detector? (Last week I had >> someone suggest making this a "respawn cgroup" or something, if it's >> not workable as-is.) Anything we can help with? > > I can revive my patch and resend. Maybe it helps to collect > new ideas (or NAKs ;)). That would be great. Start by sending the series to kernel-hardening. We can comment on it before you send a version to lkml. (i.e. try to avoid NAKs...) :) -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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