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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLKBD=CUPR7mHspzS6Oy99C+gXq+sLnHSbCJT6hXQGOXg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2015 12:15:56 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: status: GRKERNSEC_BRUTE

On Sun, Nov 29, 2015 at 2:54 PM, Richard Weinberger <richard@....at> wrote:
> Am 24.11.2015 um 20:19 schrieb Kees Cook:
>> Hi,
>>
>> While not strictly a _kernel_ self-protection mechanism, it's still
>> something that I'd love to see upstream, so I'll ping about its status
>> here too. :) Any updates on the brute force detector? (Last week I had
>> someone suggest making this a "respawn cgroup" or something, if it's
>> not workable as-is.) Anything we can help with?
>
> I can revive my patch and resend. Maybe it helps to collect
> new ideas (or NAKs ;)).

That would be great. Start by sending the series to kernel-hardening.
We can comment on it before you send a version to lkml. (i.e. try to
avoid NAKs...) :)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

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