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Message-ID: <1446979151.4680.5.camel@debian.org>
Date: Sun, 08 Nov 2015 11:39:11 +0100
From: Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@...ian.org>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>, Greg KH
<gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>, Ard
Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Subject: Re: Kernel Self Protection Project
On ven., 2015-11-06 at 10:11 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> I think GRKERNSEC_KERN_LOCKOUT is kind of on both sides of the
> kernel/userspace defense fence. For now, I think the granularity of
> response for KSPP-ported features will likely just be a full system
> Oops. But I suspect once more of them land, we'll want the finer
> granularity that GRKERNSEC_KERN_LOCKOUT provides.
Yes I was really mentioning GRKERNSEC_BRUTE because it looks similar
to GRKERNSEC_KERN_LOCKOUT but I was more interested by the latter in the
current context. In any case (whether we want fine-grained stuff or not), I
think we definitely need a way to prevent repeated exploit attempts.
Regards,
--
Yves-Alexis
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