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Message-ID: <20131003133939.GB28308@gmail.com> Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2013 15:39:39 +0200 From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> To: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred * Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> wrote: > On Thu, Oct 03, 2013 at 08:22:56AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > > > * Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> wrote: > > > > > * You can't do it for /proc/*/stat otherwise you will break userspace > > > "ps"..., ps must access /proc/1/stat etc... so the proposed solution > > > will work without any side effect. > > > > The thing is, returning -EINVAL is not the only way to reject access to > > privileged information! > > > In the /proc/1/stat case a compatibility quirk can solve the problem: > > create a special 'dummy' process inode for invalid accesses and give > > it to ps, with all fields present but zero. > > Hmm, we already return zero for the fields that must be protected. > Already done. > > Not all fields need to be zero ? If so, yes it could be done as you > propose and avoid the 'if permitted' test each time... but we don't want > to do it Indeed some fields need to be available, for utilities like 'top' to work. Thanks, Ingo
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