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Message-ID: <20131003062256.GD25345@gmail.com> Date: Thu, 3 Oct 2013 08:22:56 +0200 From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> To: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@...ntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...nvz.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred * Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org> wrote: > * You can't do it for /proc/*/stat otherwise you will break userspace > "ps"..., ps must access /proc/1/stat etc... so the proposed solution > will work without any side effect. The thing is, returning -EINVAL is not the only way to reject access to privileged information! In the /proc/1/stat case a compatibility quirk can solve the problem: create a special 'dummy' process inode for invalid accesses and give it to ps, with all fields present but zero. > And for /proc/*/maps you will perhaps break glibc under certain > situations... so just hold it for the moment and test it > later. There have been reports in the past about it. Same deal: just create a dummy compat-quirk maps inode with constant, zero information contents to placate old user-space: 00000000-00000000 ---p 00000000 00:00 0 [ Or whatever line is needed to minimally not break old userspace. ] But don't leak privileged information! ( Maybe add a CONFIG_PROC_FS_COMPAT_QUIRKS Kconfig option, default-y for now, that new/sane userspace can turn off. ) Thanks, Ingo
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