kernel-hardening mailing list - 2013/10/03

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kernel-hardening mailing list - 2013/10/03

Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@...fujitsu.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (Dave Anderson <anderson@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 5/7] x86, kaslr: select memory region from e820 maps (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v7 0/7] Kernel base address randomization on x86 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 2/7] x86, kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 7/7] x86, kaslr: raise max positions to 1GiB on x86_64 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 1/7] x86, boot: move CPU flags out of cpucheck (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position ("H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>)
Re: [PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position ("H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com>)

29 messages

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