[<prev day] [next day>] [month] [year] [list]
kernel-hardening mailing list - 2013/10/01
- [PATCH 2/7] x86, kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- [PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- [PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- [PATCH 1/7] x86, kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- [PATCH 5/7] x86, kaslr: select memory region from e820 maps (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- [PATCH 7/7] x86, kaslr: raise max positions to 1GiB on x86_64 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
- [PATCH v2 1/9] procfs: add proc_same_open_cred() to check if the cred have changed (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
- [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
- [PATCH v2 3/9] procfs: Document the proposed solution to protect procfs entries (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
- [PATCH v2 4/9] procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall} 0400 (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
- [PATCH v2 5/9] procfs: make /proc entries that use seq files able to access file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
- [PATCH v2 6/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
- [PATCH v2 7/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/personality (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
- [PATCH v2 8/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/stack (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
- [PATCH v2 9/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/syscall (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
- Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset ("H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 1/7] x86, kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck ("H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 1/7] x86, kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
22 messages
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
