kernel-hardening mailing list - 2013/10

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kernel-hardening mailing list - 2013/10

Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Sun
	¹ 22	² 32	³ 29	⁴ 16	⁵ 2	⁶
⁷ 3	⁸ 2	⁹ 26	¹⁰	¹¹ 15	¹²	¹³ 1
¹⁴ 6	¹⁵ 1	¹⁶	¹⁷	¹⁸	¹⁹	²⁰
²¹	²²	²³	²⁴	²⁵	²⁶	²⁷
²⁸	²⁹	³⁰	³¹

Messages by day:

October 1 (22 messages)

[PATCH 2/7] x86, kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 1/7] x86, kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 5/7] x86, kaslr: select memory region from e820 maps (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 7/7] x86, kaslr: raise max positions to 1GiB on x86_64 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH v2 1/9] procfs: add proc_same_open_cred() to check if the cred have changed (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH v2 3/9] procfs: Document the proposed solution to protect procfs entries (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH v2 4/9] procfs: make /proc/*/{stack,syscall} 0400 (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH v2 5/9] procfs: make /proc entries that use seq files able to access file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH v2 6/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH v2 7/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/personality (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH v2 8/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/stack (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH v2 9/9] procfs: improve permission checks on /proc/*/syscall (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset ("H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>)
Re: [PATCH 1/7] x86, kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck ("H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>)
Re: [PATCH 1/7] x86, kaslr: move CPU flags out of cpucheck (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

October 2 (32 messages)

Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 6/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization ("H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>)
Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@...fujitsu.com>)
Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@...fujitsu.com>)
Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization ("H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>)
Re: [PATCH v6 0/7] Kernel base address randomization (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@...fujitsu.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 6/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 6/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 6/9] procfs: add permission checks on the file's opener of /proc/*/stat (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 06/12] procfs: make /proc/*/stack 0400 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 06/12] procfs: make /proc/*/stack 0400 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

October 3 (29 messages)

Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@...fujitsu.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>)
Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (Dave Anderson <anderson@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
[PATCH 5/7] x86, kaslr: select memory region from e820 maps (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v7 0/7] Kernel base address randomization on x86 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 4/7] x86, kaslr: select random base offset (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 2/7] x86, kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 7/7] x86, kaslr: raise max positions to 1GiB on x86_64 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 1/7] x86, boot: move CPU flags out of cpucheck (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position ("H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>)
Re: [PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 3/7] x86, kaslr: find minimum safe relocation position ("H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com>)

October 4 (16 messages)

Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality} (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH 1/2] procfs: restore 0400 permissions on /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality} (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 0/9] procfs: protect /proc/<pid>/* files with file->f_cred (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)

October 5 (2 messages)

Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)

October 7 (3 messages)

Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@...fujitsu.com>)
Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (Dave Anderson <anderson@...hat.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)

October 8 (2 messages)

Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@...fujitsu.com>)
Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (Dave Anderson <anderson@...hat.com>)

October 9 (26 messages)

[PATCH v2] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>)
Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (HATAYAMA Daisuke <d.hatayama@...fujitsu.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v2] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic ("H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>)
Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v3] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
[PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>)

October 11 (15 messages)

[PATCH v8 1/6] x86, boot: move CPU flags out of cpucheck (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v8 5/6] x86, kaslr: report kernel offset on panic (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v8 0/6] Kernel base address randomization (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v8 6/6] x86, kaslr: raise max positions to 1GiB on x86_64 (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v8 3/6] x86, kaslr: provide randomness functions (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v8 4/6] x86, kaslr: select random position from e820 maps (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
[PATCH v8 2/6] x86, kaslr: return location from decompress_kernel (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK ("George Spelvin" <linux@...izon.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))

October 13 (1 message)

Re: [PATCH v2 2/9] procfs: add proc_allow_access() to check if file's opener may access task (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)

October 14 (6 messages)

Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...ndz.org>)
Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
[PATCH v4] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Ryan Mallon <rmallon@...il.com>)
Re: [PATCH v4] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>)

October 15 (1 message)

Re: [PATCH v4] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK (Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>)

155 messages

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