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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+_sSVsB-D+zYyzBkj0HKzyVfJOBRAxMRmge2t=sSrTAg@mail.gmail.com> Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2013 11:53:02 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com> Cc: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>, Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...p.org>, Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@...hat.com>, Alex Shi <alex.shi@...el.com>, Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@....com>, Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@...el.com>, Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, "xen-devel@...ts.xensource.com" <xen-devel@...ts.xensource.com>, "virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org" <virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org>, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>, Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, Eric Northup <digitaleric@...gle.com> Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 11:50 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote: > On 04/09/2013 11:46 AM, Kees Cook wrote: >> >> Ah-ha! Yes, I see now when comparing the debug/kernel_page_tables >> reports. It's just the High Kernel Mapping that we care about. >> Addresses outside that range are less of a leak. Excellent, then GDT >> may not be a problem. Whew. >> > > It does beg the question if we need to randomize kmalloc... which could > have issues by itself. Agreed, but this should be a separate issue. As is the fact that GDT is writable and a discoverable target. -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
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