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Message-ID: <516348F6.1080902@zytor.com>
Date: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 15:47:18 -0700
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, x86@...nel.org,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...p.org>,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@...hat.com>, Alex Shi <alex.shi@...el.com>,
Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@....com>,
Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@...el.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@...il.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
xen-devel@...ts.xensource.com,
virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Eric Northup <digitaleric@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only
On 04/08/2013 03:43 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> This makes the IDT unconditionally read-only. This primarily removes
> the IDT from being a target for arbitrary memory write attacks. It has
> an added benefit of also not leaking (via the "sidt" instruction) the
> kernel base offset, if it has been relocated.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Cc: Eric Northup <digitaleric@...gle.com>
This isn't quite what this patch does, though, right? There is still a
writable IDT mapping at all times, which is different from a true
readonly IDT, no?
-hpa
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