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Message-ID: <515F14B6.9090603@zytor.com>
Date: Fri, 05 Apr 2013 11:15:18 -0700
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
x86@...nel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...el.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg@...hat.com>,
Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@...el.com>,
Eric Northup <digitaleric@...gle.com>,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>,
Julien Tinnes <jln@...gle.com>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86: routines to choose random kernel base offset
On 04/05/2013 12:36 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org> wrote:
>
>>
>> * Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>>
>>> This provides routines for selecting a randomized kernel base offset,
>>> bounded by e820 details. It tries to use RDRAND and falls back to RDTSC.
>>> If "noaslr" is on the kernel command line, no offset will be used.
>>
>> Would it make sense to also add three other sources of entropy:
>
> In any case, would it be possible to also mix these bootup sources of
> entropy into our regular random pool?
>
> That would improve random pool entropy on all Linux systems, not just
> those that choose to enable kernel-base-address randomization.
>
I think we already do at least some of these, but at this point, for any
non-RDRAND-capable hardware we could almost certainly do better for any
definition of anything at all.
RDRAND is obviously the ultimate solution here.
-hpa
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