[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAObL_7GKUQ0TdGtbJj39oVZPGVwa7dwWAfHXj=r9G6o2fMAshg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 17:55:02 -0700
From: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
mcgrathr@...gle.com, indan@....nu, netdev@...isplace.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
mingo@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org, rdunlap@...otime.net,
tglx@...utronix.de, serge.hallyn@...onical.com, pmoore@...hat.com,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, corbet@....net, markus@...omium.org,
coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@...omium.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 5:38 PM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote:
> On 05/24/2012 05:26 PM, Andrew Lutomirski wrote:
>>
>> Just to clarify: are you suggesting that, for now, the traced behavior
>> should be:
>>
>> process -> seccomp -> ptrace -> kernel?
>>
>> If so, I think the man page or something should have a big fat warning
>> that seccomp filters should *never* allow ptrace (even PTRACE_TRACEME)
>> unless they fully understand the issue.
>>
>
> Yes, and yes.
>
>> In any case, I think that the UML interaction is missing the point.
>> UML will *emulate* the seccomp filter. If it chooses to use host
>> seccomp filters for some business, that's its business.
>
> I don't see why UML should have to emulate the seccomp filter. With the
> proposed order, then it can simply use the seccomp filter provided by
> the host. Furthermore, with this sequencing UML can actually *use*
> seccomp to provide the simulation.
Hmm. I guess I agree. I'll shut up now :)
--Andy
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
