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Message-ID: <CAB=4xhp3WYoD6RnY+Y=XV18RiCLOeT-dsDmHxAVUYpaSUMpZdA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 11:07:31 -0700
From: Roland McGrath <mcgrathr@...gle.com>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, indan@....nu,
netdev@...isplace.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, mingo@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com,
peterz@...radead.org, rdunlap@...otime.net, tglx@...utronix.de, luto@....edu,
serge.hallyn@...onical.com, pmoore@...hat.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
corbet@....net, markus@...omium.org, coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
keescook@...omium.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, jmorris@...ei.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call
On Thu, May 24, 2012 at 9:13 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com> wrote:
> I think this really screws with using seccomp for self-interception. I
> wouldn't inherently be opposed to the following flow:
>
> seccomp -> ptrace -> seccomp
>
> ... i.e. if ptrace is enabled and we enable something, run it through
> seccomp again, but there are bunch of use cases (mostly involving
> SIGSYS) where doing ptrace before seccomp is just bizarre.
Are you sure? This is ptrace syscall tracing going first.
If seccomp generates a SIGSYS, then ptrace will still get its opportunity
to intercept the signal and change the register state however it likes.
Thanks,
Roland
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