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Message-ID: <4FBECAC2.6050303@zytor.com>
Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 16:56:50 -0700
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu>
CC: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mcgrathr@...gle.com, indan@....nu,
netdev@...isplace.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, mingo@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com,
peterz@...radead.org, rdunlap@...otime.net, tglx@...utronix.de,
serge.hallyn@...onical.com, pmoore@...hat.com,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, corbet@....net, markus@...omium.org,
coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@...omium.org,
viro@...iv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call
On 05/24/2012 04:43 PM, Andrew Lutomirski wrote:
>
> IMO the behavior should change. Alternatively, a post-ptrace syscall
> should have to pass the *tracer's* seccomp filter, but that seems
> overcomplicated and confusing.
>
> OTOH, allowing ptrace in a seccomp filter is asking for trouble anyway
> -- if you can ptrace something outside the sandbox, you've escaped.
>
This is my suggestion: if there is demand, make it possible to install a
*second* seccomp filter program which is run on the result of the
ptrace. I.e.:
Untraced: process -> seccomp1 -> kernel
Traced: process -> seccomp1 -> ptrace -> seccomp2 -> kernel
This is something we could add later if there is demand.
-hpa
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