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Message-Id: <20120524150057.86c14b35.akpm@linux-foundation.org> Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 15:00:57 -0700 From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> To: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, mcgrathr@...gle.com, hpa@...or.com, indan@....nu, netdev@...isplace.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, mingo@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org, rdunlap@...otime.net, tglx@...utronix.de, luto@....edu, serge.hallyn@...onical.com, pmoore@...hat.com, corbet@....net, markus@...omium.org, coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@...omium.org, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, jmorris@...ei.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call On Thu, 24 May 2012 11:07:58 -0500 Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org> wrote: > This is an RFC based on the comments from Al Viro and Eric Paris > regarding ptrace()rs being able to change the system call the kernel > sees after the seccomp enforcement has occurred (for mode 1 or 2). Perhaps you could repeat those comments in this changelog. > With this series applied, a (p)tracer of a process with seccomp enabled > will be unable to change the tracee's system call number after the > secure computing check has been performed. > > The x86 change is tested, as is the seccomp.c change. For other arches, > it is not (RFC :). Given that there are other inconsistencies in this > code across architectures, I'm not sure if it makes sense to attempt to > fix them all at once or to roll through as I attempt to add seccomp > filter support. > > As is, the biggest benefit of this change is just setting consistent > expectations in what the ptrace/seccomp interactions should be. The > current ability for ptrace to "bypass" secure computing (by remapping > allowed system calls) is not necessarily a problem, but it is not > necessarily intuitive behavior. > Because my take on the above reasoning is "why did you bother writing these patches"!
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