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Message-Id: <20120406142423.b2cb2f61.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2012 14:24:23 -0700
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
 kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
 x86@...nel.org, arnd@...db.de, davem@...emloft.net, hpa@...or.com,
 mingo@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org,
 rdunlap@...otime.net, mcgrathr@...omium.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
 luto@....edu, eparis@...hat.com, serge.hallyn@...onical.com,
 djm@...drot.org, scarybeasts@...il.com, indan@....nu, pmoore@...hat.com,
 corbet@....net, eric.dumazet@...il.com, markus@...omium.org,
 coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@...omium.org, jmorris@...ei.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 13/15] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support

On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:58 -0500
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org> wrote:

> This change adds support for a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP,
> and a new return value for seccomp BPF programs, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE.
> 
> When a tracer specifies the PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP ptrace option, the
> tracer will be notified, via PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, for any syscall that
> results in a BPF program returning SECCOMP_RET_TRACE.  The 16-bit
> SECCOMP_RET_DATA mask of the BPF program return value will be passed as
> the ptrace_message and may be retrieved using PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG.
> 
> If the subordinate process is not using seccomp filter, then no
> system call notifications will occur even if the option is specified.
> 
> If there is no tracer with PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP when SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
> is returned, the system call will not be executed and an -ENOSYS errno
> will be returned to userspace.
> 
> This change adds a dependency on the system call slow path.  Any future
> efforts to use the system call fast path for seccomp filter will need to
> address this restriction.
> 
>
> ...
>
> @@ -410,6 +411,15 @@ int __secure_computing_int(int this_syscall)
>  			/* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */
>  			seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, data);
>  			goto skip;
> +		case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
> +			/* Skip these calls if there is no tracer. */
> +			if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP))
> +				goto skip;
> +			/* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
> +			ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data);
> +			if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
> +				break;

I don't have all the patches applied here so the context is missing. 
Perhaps tht would help me understand what this fatal_signal_pending()
test is doing here.  But an explanatory comment wouldn't hurt.

What *is* it here for, anyway?

> +			return 0;
>  		case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
>  			return 0;
>  		case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:

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