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Message-Id: <20120406141415.93f46bc6.akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2012 14:14:15 -0700
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
To: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
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mingo@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org,
rdunlap@...otime.net, mcgrathr@...omium.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
luto@....edu, eparis@...hat.com, serge.hallyn@...onical.com,
djm@...drot.org, scarybeasts@...il.com, indan@....nu, pmoore@...hat.com,
corbet@....net, eric.dumazet@...il.com, markus@...omium.org,
coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, keescook@...omium.org, jmorris@...ei.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging
On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:54 -0500
Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org> wrote:
> From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>
> This consolidates the seccomp filter error logging path and adds more
> details to the audit log.
>
> ...
>
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
>
> ...
>
> #define audit_inode(n,d) do { (void)(d); } while (0)
> #define audit_inode_child(i,p) do { ; } while (0)
> #define audit_core_dumps(i) do { ; } while (0)
> -#define audit_seccomp(i) do { ; } while (0)
> +#define audit_seccomp(i,s,c) do { ; } while (0)
Sigh. Someone please convert all these to C. That way we get
typechecking and don't need dopey party tricks like that "(void)(d)" to
squish compilation warnings.
> ...
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
> #include <linux/syscalls.h>
> #include <linux/capability.h>
> #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
> +#include <linux/compat.h>
>
> #include "audit.h"
>
> @@ -2710,13 +2711,18 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
> audit_log_end(ab);
> }
>
> -void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall)
> +void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
>
> ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
> - audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", SIGKILL);
> + audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", signr);
> audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> + audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
> +#endif
We don't need the ifdef for compilation reasons now.
The question is: should we emit the compat= record on
non-compat-capable architectures? Doing so would be safer - making it
conditional invites people to write x86-only usersapce.
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