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Message-ID: <1330374879.2542.24.camel@localhost> Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 15:34:39 -0500 From: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, arnd@...db.de, davem@...emloft.net, hpa@...or.com, mingo@...hat.com, oleg@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org, rdunlap@...otime.net, mcgrathr@...omium.org, tglx@...utronix.de, luto@....edu, serge.hallyn@...onical.com, djm@...drot.org, scarybeasts@...il.com, indan@....nu, pmoore@...hat.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, corbet@....net, eric.dumazet@...il.com, markus@...omium.org, coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 06/12] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF On Mon, 2012-02-27 at 12:00 -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 11:25 AM, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com> wrote: > > On Mon, 2012-02-27 at 10:55 -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > >> On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 8:49 AM, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com> wrote: > > > >> You mean as used in audit_log_exit() ? It looks like that depends on a > >> lot of state cached in __audit_syscall_entry() and finally triggered > >> in __audit_syscall_exit() (and ..._free()). I don't think this is > >> really want seccomp wants to be involved in. > >> > >> By CONFIG_AUDITSC, you mean CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL? Without that set, > >> audit_seccomp is a no-op. > >> > >> The reason compat needs to be reported (or rather, arch) is because > >> just reporting syscall is ambiguous. It either needs arch or compat to > >> distinguish it. > > > > Yes, that is what I mean and you are right. You shouldn't push the > > syscall in this record either. If !audit_dummy_context() you are > > already going to get arch, syscall, and a0-a4 in the associated audit > > record. Please do not duplicate that info. > > Ah, in that case, please ignore the patch I just sent. Heh. > > > It might make sense to have a separate audit_seccomp() path when > > audit_dummy_context() which includes arch, syscall, and a0-a4. > > Ah! I think I understand what you mean now. If audit_dummy_context(), > then the syscall, arch, and a0-a4 were not already collected. Gotcha. > > How do you envision it looking? I still see it as two distinct events > (the syscall itself, and the rejection). Would you want those details > added to the context structure to be reported at ..._exit() time? It > seems like context->type couldn't be used to see if those fields were > valid. > > Something like: > > void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr) > { > struct audit_buffer *ab; > > if (!audit_dummy_context()) { > struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; > context->syscall_signr = signr; > context->syscall_ip = KSTK_EIP(current); > return; > } > > ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); > audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", signr); > audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall); > audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current)); > audit_log_end(ab); > } > > And then report syscall_ip and syscall_signr if syscall_signr != 0 in > the _exit()? I think everything else from audit_log_abend() will end > up in the _exit() report. > > > It is my fault (85e7bac3) that we have syscall at all, but I'm on a new > > crusade to remove audit record duplication. So I'd happily see a patch > > in this series that removes that instead of adds to it. > > Well, I think the abend reporting is nice; I'd hate to see that > totally removed. The seccomp case is a bit different, I agree. I could > see it either way. Once again I send you down a bad path. Your original patch was the best. We should consider including a0-aX in a future version. I was mistaken in foolishly believing that audit_syscall_entry() was done before secure_computing(). But if you look, that isn't the case. Please pretend I never said anything as you had it right the first time. -Eric
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