[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAObL_7GZVrHpQ0yR9LihQ=UrjAR=BOLRT1F0m4JGGRbEeh=-fQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 10:35:55 -0800
From: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@....edu>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, arnd@...db.de, davem@...emloft.net,
hpa@...or.com, mingo@...hat.com, peterz@...radead.org, rdunlap@...otime.net,
mcgrathr@...omium.org, tglx@...utronix.de, eparis@...hat.com,
serge.hallyn@...onical.com, djm@...drot.org, scarybeasts@...il.com,
indan@....nu, pmoore@...hat.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, corbet@....net,
eric.dumazet@...il.com, markus@...omium.org, coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 07/12] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 10:14 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 02/27, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 9:11 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
>> > On 02/24, Will Drewry wrote:
>> >>
>> >> static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
>> >> {
>> >> struct seccomp_filter *f;
>> >> - u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>> >> static const struct bpf_load_fn fns = {
>> >> bpf_load,
>> >> sizeof(struct seccomp_data),
>> >> };
>> >> + u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
>> >> const void *sc_ptr = (const void *)(uintptr_t)syscall;
>> >>
>> >> + /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
>> >> + if (unlikely(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
>> >> + ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>> >
>> > Is "seccomp.filter == NULL" really possible?
>>
>> It should not be, but I'm much more comfortable with this failing
>> closed. I think it's important to be as defensive as possible with
>> this code given its intended use.
>
> Can't resists... Sorry, I know I am troll but personally I think
> in this case the most defensive code is BUG_ON(->filter == NULL)
> or at least WARN_ON().
Linus will probably object because he objected (correctly) to a very
similar problem in my old vsyscall emulation series. A userspace
security feature shouldn't have a failure mode in which it confuses
the kernel and results in an oops, unless the situation is really
unrecoverable. So WARN_ON plus do_exit would be okay but BUG_ON would
not.
--Andy
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
