[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJQhfSSwTU5fSGR_Q57LAQBFW25A_FtR2GFsxyT_ibnzQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2012 10:09:38 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
arnd@...db.de, davem@...emloft.net, hpa@...or.com, mingo@...hat.com,
peterz@...radead.org, rdunlap@...otime.net, mcgrathr@...omium.org,
tglx@...utronix.de, luto@....edu, eparis@...hat.com,
serge.hallyn@...onical.com, djm@...drot.org, scarybeasts@...il.com,
indan@....nu, pmoore@...hat.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, corbet@....net,
eric.dumazet@...il.com, markus@...omium.org, coreyb@...ux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 07/12] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
On Mon, Feb 27, 2012 at 9:11 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 02/24, Will Drewry wrote:
>>
>> static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
>> {
>> struct seccomp_filter *f;
>> - u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>> static const struct bpf_load_fn fns = {
>> bpf_load,
>> sizeof(struct seccomp_data),
>> };
>> + u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
>> const void *sc_ptr = (const void *)(uintptr_t)syscall;
>>
>> + /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
>> + if (unlikely(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
>> + ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>
> Is "seccomp.filter == NULL" really possible?
It should not be, but I'm much more comfortable with this failing
closed. I think it's important to be as defensive as possible with
this code given its intended use.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
