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Message-ID: <20120105091704.GB3249@elte.hu>
Date: Thu, 5 Jan 2012 10:17:04 +0100
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Federica Teodori <federica.teodori@...glemail.com>,
Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@...il.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...otime.net>,
Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2012.1] fs: symlink restrictions on sticky directories
* Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> @@ -1495,6 +1496,15 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
> #endif
> #endif
> {
> + .procname = "protected_sticky_symlinks",
> + .data = &protected_sticky_symlinks,
> + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
> + .mode = 0644,
> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> + .extra1 = &zero,
> + .extra2 = &one,
> + },
Small detail:
Might make sense to change the .mode to 0600, to make it harder
for unprivileged attack code to guess whether this protection
(and the resulting audit warning to the administrator) is
enabled on a system or not.
It can be probed, but only at the cost of generating a warning.
Likewise, distros should set /etc/sysctl.conf to 0600 as well,
for similar reasons.
Thanks,
Ingo
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