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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+Y6JnTFhw3Fax_MYLvLLBMO5JOHLgaVyBB2LMsOwhUHw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2011 10:12:50 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [RFC] Make Yama pid_ns aware
On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 8:55 AM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 14:49 +0000, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> Quoting Vasiliy Kulikov (segoon@...nwall.com):
>> > Actually, what concerns me is not ptrace, but symlink/hardling
>> > protection. There is no interaction between namespaces in case of
>> > containers via symlinks in the basic case. In case of ptrace I don't
>> > think the child ns may weaken the parent ns - child ns may not access
>> > processes of the parent namespace and everything it may ptrace is
>> > already inside of this ns.
>>
>> Oh, yes. If you're saying the symlink protection shouldn't be
>> per-pidns, I agree it seems an odd fit.
>>
>> How about a version of this patch leaving symlink protection
>> out of pidns (maybe in user ns), and just putting ptrace
>> protection per-pidns?
>
> I don't think moving symlink/hardling from pid ns to user ns is a good
> idea as user ns is not matured yet. Also we (Openwall) want to use Yama
> almost as-is in our RHEL6 and RHEL5-based kernels with OpenVZ support
> which don't have user namespaces yet at all (yes, it is not a cause for
> mainline decisions :-) ).
>
> While user ns is not yet ready, I don't clearly see what is the division
> of security policies among namespaces including user namespace. I had
> a view that all stuff related to processes (i.e. distinct processes in
> several ways) belongs to pid ns, all net stuff to net ns, etc. If we
> differentiate user ns and pid ns, only strictly things handling pids
> (like kill(2), procfs, ptrace(2), etc.) belong to pid ns and all other
> process-related stuff (like credentials handling, these symlink/hardling
> things, etc.) belong to user namespaces.
>
> Can we probably leave them in pid ns for now and when user ns is matured
> just move it from pid ns to user ns? Is it possible without breaking
> Yama's ABI (I think so)?
So it sounds like you'll send a new patch where only ptrace_scope is
tied to pidns?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security
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