[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20110923162515.GA3090@albatros>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2011 20:25:15 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [RFCv2] x86, mm: start mmap allocation for libs from low
addresses
Hi,
Any comments on the patch?
Thanks,
On Wed, Sep 07, 2011 at 18:58 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> This patch changes mmap base address allocator logic to incline to
> allocate addresses for executable pages from the first 16 MBs of address
> space. These addresses start from zero byte (0x00AABBCC). Using such
> addresses breaks ret2libc exploits abusing string buffer overflows (or
> makes such attacks harder and/or less reliable).
>
> As x86 architecture is little-endian, this zero byte is the last byte of
> the address. So it's possible to e.g. overwrite a return address on the
> stack with the malformed address. However, now it's impossible to
> additionally provide function arguments, which are located after the
> function address on the stack. The attacker's best bet may be to find
> an entry point not at function boundary that sets registers and then
> proceeds with or branches to the desired library code. The easiest way
> to set registers and branch would be a function epilogue. Then it may
> be similarly difficult to reliably pass register values and a further
> address to branch to, because the desired values for these will also
> tend to contain NULs - e.g., the address of "/bin/sh" in libc or a zero
> value for root's uid. A possible bypass is via multiple overflows - if
> the overflow may be triggered more than once before the vulnerable
> function returns, then multiple NULs may be written, exactly one per
> overflow. But this is hopefully relatively rare.
>
> To fully utilize the protection, the executable image should be
> randomized (sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space > 0 and the executable is
> compiled as PIE) and the sum of libraries sizes plus executable size
> shouldn't exceed 16 MBs. In this case the only pages out of
> ASCII-protected range are VDSO and vsyscall pages. However, they don't
> provide enough material for obtaining arbitrary code execution and are
> not dangerous without using other executable pages.
>
> The logic is applied to x86 32 bit tasks, both for 32 bit kernels and
> for 32 bit tasks running on 64 bit kernels. 64 bit tasks already have
> zero bytes in addresses of library functions. Other architectures
> (non-x86) may reuse the logic too.
>
> Without the patch:
>
> $ ldd /bin/ls
> linux-gate.so.1 => (0xf779c000)
> librt.so.1 => /lib/librt.so.1 (0xb7fcf000)
> libtermcap.so.2 => /lib/libtermcap.so.2 (0xb7fca000)
> libc.so.6 => /lib/libc.so.6 (0xb7eae000)
> libpthread.so.0 => /lib/libpthread.so.0 (0xb7e5b000)
> /lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0xb7fe6000)
>
> With the patch:
>
> $ ldd /bin/ls
> linux-gate.so.1 => (0xf772a000)
> librt.so.1 => /lib/librt.so.1 (0x0004a000)
> libtermcap.so.2 => /lib/libtermcap.so.2 (0x0005e000)
> libc.so.6 => /lib/libc.so.6 (0x00062000)
> libpthread.so.0 => /lib/libpthread.so.0 (0x00183000)
> /lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0x00121000)
>
>
> If CONFIG_VM86=y, the first 1 MB + 64 KBs are excluded from the potential
> range for mmap allocations as it might be used by vm86 code. If
> CONFIG_VM86=n, the allocation begins from 128 KBs to protect against
> userspace NULL pointer dereferences (or from mmap_min_addr if it is
> bigger than 128 KBs). Regardless of CONFIG_VM86 the base address is
> randomized with the same entropy size as mm->mmap_base.
>
> If 16 MBs are over, we fallback to the old allocation algorithm.
> But, hopefully, programs which need such protection (network daemons,
> programs working with untrusted data, etc.) are small enough to utilize
> the protection.
>
> The same logic was used in -ow patch for 2.0-2.4 kernels and in
> exec-shield for 2.6.x kernels. Code parts were taken from exec-shield
> from RHEL6.
>
>
> v2 - Added comments, adjusted patch description.
> - s/arch_get_unmapped_exec_area/get_unmapped_exec_area/
> - Don't reserve the first 1 MB + 64 KBs if CONFIG_VM86=n.
>
> Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
> --
> arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 23 ++++++++++++
> include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 ++
> include/linux/sched.h | 3 ++
> mm/mmap.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> 4 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
> index 1dab519..0bbbb3d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -118,6 +118,25 @@ static unsigned long mmap_legacy_base(void)
> return TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + mmap_rnd();
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_VM86
> +/*
> + * Don't touch any memory that can be addressed by vm86 apps.
> + * Reserve the first 1 MB + 64 KBs.
> + */
> +#define ASCII_ARMOR_MIN_ADDR 0x00110000
> +#else
> +/*
> + * No special users of low addresses.
> + * Reserve the first 128 KBs to detect NULL pointer dereferences.
> + */
> +#define ASCII_ARMOR_MIN_ADDR 0x00020000
> +#endif
> +
> +static unsigned long mmap_lib_base(void)
> +{
> + return ASCII_ARMOR_MIN_ADDR + mmap_rnd();
> +}
> +
> /*
> * This function, called very early during the creation of a new
> * process VM image, sets up which VM layout function to use:
> @@ -131,6 +150,10 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
> } else {
> mm->mmap_base = mmap_base();
> mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
> + if (mmap_is_ia32()) {
> + mm->get_unmapped_exec_area = get_unmapped_exec_area;
> + mm->lib_mmap_base = mmap_lib_base();
> + }
> mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area_topdown;
> }
> }
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h
> index 027935c..68fc216 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm_types.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h
> @@ -225,9 +225,13 @@ struct mm_struct {
> unsigned long (*get_unmapped_area) (struct file *filp,
> unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
> unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags);
> + unsigned long (*get_unmapped_exec_area) (struct file *filp,
> + unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
> + unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags);
> void (*unmap_area) (struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr);
> #endif
> unsigned long mmap_base; /* base of mmap area */
> + unsigned long lib_mmap_base; /* base of mmap libraries area (for get_unmapped_exec_area()) */
> unsigned long task_size; /* size of task vm space */
> unsigned long cached_hole_size; /* if non-zero, the largest hole below free_area_cache */
> unsigned long free_area_cache; /* first hole of size cached_hole_size or larger */
> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> index f024c63..ef9024f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> @@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
> unsigned long flags);
> extern void arch_unmap_area(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long);
> extern void arch_unmap_area_topdown(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long);
> +extern unsigned long
> +get_unmapped_exec_area(struct file *, unsigned long,
> + unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
> #else
> static inline void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm) {}
> #endif
> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> index d49736f..cb81804 100644
> --- a/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ static void unmap_region(struct mm_struct *mm,
> struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct *prev,
> unsigned long start, unsigned long end);
>
> +static unsigned long
> +get_unmapped_area_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
> + unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags, bool exec);
> +
> /*
> * WARNING: the debugging will use recursive algorithms so never enable this
> * unless you know what you are doing.
> @@ -989,7 +993,8 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
> /* Obtain the address to map to. we verify (or select) it and ensure
> * that it represents a valid section of the address space.
> */
> - addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
> + addr = get_unmapped_area_prot(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags,
> + prot & PROT_EXEC);
> if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
> return addr;
>
> @@ -1528,6 +1533,67 @@ bottomup:
> }
> #endif
>
> +/* Addresses before this value contain at least one zero byte. */
> +#define ASCII_ARMOR_MAX_ADDR 0x01000000
> +
> +/*
> + * This function finds the first unmapped region inside of
> + * [mm->lib_mmap_base; ASCII_ARMOR_MAX_ADDR) region. Addresses from this
> + * region contain at least one zero byte, which complicates
> + * exploitation of C string buffer overflows (C strings cannot contain zero
> + * byte inside) in return to libc class of attacks.
> + *
> + * This allocator is bottom up allocator like arch_get_unmapped_area(), but
> + * it differs from the latter. get_unmapped_exec_area() does its best to
> + * allocate as low address as possible.
> + */
> +unsigned long
> +get_unmapped_exec_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr0,
> + unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
> +{
> + unsigned long addr = addr0;
> + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> +
> + if (len > TASK_SIZE)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
> + return addr;
> +
> + /* We ALWAYS start from the beginning as base addresses
> + * with zero high bits is a scarce and valuable resource */
> + addr = max_t(unsigned long, mm->lib_mmap_base, mmap_min_addr);
> +
> + for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
> + /* At this point: (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
> + if (addr > TASK_SIZE - len)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + /*
> + * If kernel.randomize_va_space < 2, the executable is built as
> + * non-PIE, and exec image base is lower than ASCII_ARMOR_MAX_ADDR,
> + * it's possible to touch or overrun brk area in ASCII-armor
> + * zone. We don't want to reduce future brk growth, so we
> + * fallback to the default allocator in this case.
> + */
> + if (mm->brk && addr + len > mm->brk)
> + goto failed;
> +
> + if (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start)
> + return addr;
> +
> + addr = vma->vm_end;
> +
> + /* If ACSII-armor area is over, the algo gives up */
> + if (addr >= ASCII_ARMOR_MAX_ADDR)
> + goto failed;
> + }
> +
> +failed:
> + return current->mm->get_unmapped_area(filp, addr0, len, pgoff, flags);
> +}
> +
> void arch_unmap_area_topdown(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
> {
> /*
> @@ -1541,9 +1607,9 @@ void arch_unmap_area_topdown(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
> mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
> }
>
> -unsigned long
> -get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
> - unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
> +static unsigned long
> +get_unmapped_area_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
> + unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags, bool exec)
> {
> unsigned long (*get_area)(struct file *, unsigned long,
> unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
> @@ -1556,7 +1622,11 @@ get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
> if (len > TASK_SIZE)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> - get_area = current->mm->get_unmapped_area;
> + if (exec && current->mm->get_unmapped_exec_area)
> + get_area = current->mm->get_unmapped_exec_area;
> + else
> + get_area = current->mm->get_unmapped_area;
> +
> if (file && file->f_op && file->f_op->get_unmapped_area)
> get_area = file->f_op->get_unmapped_area;
> addr = get_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
> @@ -1571,6 +1641,13 @@ get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
> return arch_rebalance_pgtables(addr, len);
> }
>
> +unsigned long
> +get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
> + unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
> +{
> + return get_unmapped_area_prot(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags, false);
> +}
> +
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_unmapped_area);
>
> /* Look up the first VMA which satisfies addr < vm_end, NULL if none. */
>
> --
> Vasiliy
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
