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Message-ID: <CAOJsxLGZm+npcR0YgXSE2wLC2iXCtzYyCdTDCt1LN=Z28Rm_UA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 19:11:22 +0300
From: Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>, Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>,
Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>, Jesper Juhl <jj@...osbits.net>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo
On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 6:57 PM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 18:13 +0300, Pekka Enberg wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 5:46 PM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> wrote:
>> >> and
>> >> concluded that it's not worth it doesn't really protect from anything
>> >
>> > Closing only slabinfo doesn't add any significant protection against
>> > kernel heap exploits per se, no objections here.
>> >
>> > But as said in the desciption, the reason for this patch is not protecting
>> > against exploitation heap bugs. It is a source of infoleaks of kernel
>> > and userspace activity, which should be forbidden to non-root users.
>>
>> Last time we discussed this, the 'extra protection' didn't seem to be
>> significant enough to justify disabling an useful kernel debugging
>> interface by default.
>>
>> What's different about the patch now?
>
> The exploitation you're talking about is an exploitation of kernel heap
> bugs. Dan's previous "make slabinfo 0400" patch tried to complicate
> attacker's life by hiding information about how many free object are
> left in the slab. With this information an attacker may compute how he
> should spray the slab to position slab object to increase his chances of
> overwriting specific memory areas - pointers, etc.
>
> I don't speak about how much/whether closing slabinfo complicates this
> task, though. My idea is orthogonal to the Dan's idea. I claim that
> with 0444 slabinfo any user may get information about in-system activity
> that he shouldn't learn. In short, one may learn precisely when other
> user reads directory contents, opens files, how much files there are in
> the specific _private_ directory, how much files _private_ ecryptfs or
> fuse mount point contains, etc. This breaks user's assumption that
> the number of files in a private directory is a private information.
> There are a bit more thoughts in the patch description.
Yes, I read your patch description and I think it's convincing enough
to warrant a config option but not changing the default.
However, if the encryptfs and infoleaks really are serious enough to
hide /proc/slabinfo, I think you should consider switching over to
kmalloc() instead of kmem_cache_alloc() to make sure nobody can
gain access to the information. Or add a SLAB_ANON flag for
kmem_cache_create() that forces SLUB cache merging to existing
caches.
>> >> and causes harm to developers.
>> >
>> > One note: only to _kernel_ developers. It means it is a strictly
>> > debugging feature, which shouldn't be enabled in the production systems.
>>
>> It's pretty much _the_ interface for debugging kernel memory leaks in
>> production systems and we ask users for it along with /proc/meminfo
>> when debugging many memory management related issues. When we
>> temporarily dropped /proc/slabinfo with the introduction of SLUB, people
>> complained pretty loudly.
>
> Could you point to the discussion, please? I cannot find the patch for
> 0400 slabinfo even in the linux-history repository.
We dropped the whole file for SLUB:
http://lwn.net/Articles/263337/
[ I didn't find the original discussion that motivated the above
patch but it should be somewhere in LKML archives around
that time. ]
Making it root-only will have pretty much the same kind of
out-of-the-box behavior.
>> I'd be willing to consider this patch if it's a config option that's not enabled
>> by default; otherwise you need to find someone else to merge the patch.
>> You can add some nasty warnings to the Kconfig text to scare the users
>> into enabling it. ;-)
>
> How do you see this CONFIG_ option? CONFIG_PROCFS_COMPAT_MODES (or _PERMS),
> defaults to Y? If we find more procfs files with dangerous permissions,
> we may move it under "ifndef CONFIG_PROCFS_COMPAT_PERMS".
I guess CONFIG_RESTRICT_PROCFS type of thing makes most sense
since the problem is not only about SLAB. If you want to make it slab-only
config option, I'm fine with that too.
Please note that you need to restrict sysfs files for SLUB as well.
Pekka
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