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Message-ID: <CAOJsxLHWu7gm94MvFOcbrjW33AqpD7i+kYL1+mEMt=4cS53GhA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 22:20:16 +0300
From: Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>, Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>,
Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>, Jesper Juhl <jj@...osbits.net>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo
On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 9:55 PM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> wrote:
> Oh, we also have perf... Given these are separate interfaces, I think
> slab oriented restriction makes more sense.
>
> So, now we have:
>
> /proc/slabinfo
> /sys/kernel/slab
> /proc/meminfo
> 'perf kmem' - not sure what specific files should be guarded
I don't think you can close down 'perf kmem' per se. You need to make
sure the attacker is not able to use perf tracing (of which 'perf kmem' is
a subset).
Pekka
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