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Message-ID: <CAOJsxLGc0bwCkDtk2PVe7c155a9wVoDAY0CmYDTLg8_bL4qxqg@mail.gmail.com> Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 20:51:59 +0300 From: Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi> To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>, Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>, Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>, Jesper Juhl <jj@...osbits.net>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 8:35 PM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> wrote: >> Yes, but there's no way for users to know where the allocations came from >> if you mix them up with other kmalloc-128 call-sites. That way the number >> of private files will stay private to the user, no? Doesn't that give you even >> better protection against the infoleak? > > No, what it gives us is an obscurity, not a protection. I'm sure it > highly depends on the specific situation whether an attacker is able to > identify whether the call is from e.g. ecryptfs or from VFS. Also the > correlation between the number in slabinfo and the real private actions > still exists. How is the attacker able to identify that we kmalloc()'d from ecryptfs or VFS based on non-root /proc/slabinfo when the slab allocator itself does not have that sort of information if you mix up the allocations? Isn't this much stronger protection especially if you combine that with /proc/slabinfo restriction? Pekka
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