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Message-ID: <20110729090053.GA7274@albatros>
Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2011 13:00:53 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: -ow features
Solar,
On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 20:27 +0400, Solar Designer wrote:
> Can you please post a summary on the status of -ow patch features as it
> relates to mainline acceptance of their equivalents?
Sorry for the delay, I didn't somehow noticed this email.
HARDEN_STACK*
The code similar to -ow patch is ready, but it doesn't handle DSO cases
of stack usage. I've described the problem here:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2011/07/18/8
HARDEN_VM86
The code similar to -ow patch is ready, but I don't know how it should
be implemented relative to LSM/seccomp/etc. It looks like a small
feature, which is not consistent with current upstream security
architecture. I've described the problem here:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2011/06/19/2
Without the major change of the configuration mechanism it's impossible
to get it applied.
HARDEN_PAGE0
It is a part of Linux for many years. Distros may setup their own
mmap_min_addr limit and the default is 64K. So, I don't see what can be
improved here.
HARDEN_LINK
HARDEN_FIFO
These are implemented in YAMA LSM. Kees Cook's last attempt (AFAIK) is:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-security-module&m=130023775422255&w=2
James Morris' reaction:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-security-module&m=130032319219333&w=2
So, the issue is that LSM guys say that LSM is the place where only
enhanced access control schemes may be located, but VFS folks
say that all similar non-POSIX restrictions should go into LSM as a
configurable security feature (extern relative to VFS). This
inconsistency is really nasty :(
HARDEN_PROC
The patch as in -ow received negative response from Andrew Morton as too
limited:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2011/06/21/3
I'm working on it. The demonstration is:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2011/07/26/5
HARDEN_NLIMIT_NPROC
The discussion:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2011/06/12/9
The latest patch:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2011/07/29/3
(It has already got a Reviewed-by from James, which is very good.)
HARDEN_SHM
The patch:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2011/06/22/4
It was applied first to -mm tree, now it is merged into Linus' linux-2.6
tree (it will be part of Linux 3.1).
Special handling of fd 0,1,2 (Linux 2.0/2.2) for set*id
It is handled in glibc now by opening /dev/{null,full}, however, I see
(minor) drawbacks:
1) It's possible to have a chroot without polluted /dev/, so setuid
inside of chroot might fail to reopen fds.
2) It's not handled in other libc implementations.
Other than that, it already works.
Privileged IP aliases (Linux 2.0)
I think it was fully obsoleted with network namespaces.
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy
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