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Message-ID: <20110719074043.GA3942@albatros>
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2011 11:40:43 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	x86@...nel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC v2] implement SL*B and stack
 usercopy runtime checks

On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 11:52 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > +noinline bool __kernel_access_ok(const void *ptr, unsigned long len)
> 
> noinline seems unneeded

Ah, understood what you mean.  It is .c, and users are in other .c, so
it is indeed redundant.

Thanks!

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

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