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Message-ID: <20110703192442.GA9504@albatros>
Date: Sun, 3 Jul 2011 23:24:42 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC v1] implement SL*B and stack
usercopy runtime checks
On Sun, Jul 03, 2011 at 12:10 -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 11:57 AM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> wrote:
> >> If you seriously clean it up (that at a minimum includes things like
> >> making it configurable using some pretty helper function that just
> >> compiles away for all the normal cases,
> >
> > Hm, it is not as simple as it looks at the first glance - even if the
> > object size is known at the compile time (__compiletime_object_size), it
> > might be a field of a structure, which crosses the slab object
> > boundaries because of an overflow.
>
> No, I was more talking about having something like
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_EXPENSIVE_CHECK_USERCOPY
> extern int check_user_copy(const void *kptr, unsigned long size);
> #else
> static inline int check_user_copy(const void *kptr, unsigned long size)
> { return 0; }
> #endif
Sure, will do. This is what I mean by kernel_access_ok() as it is a
weak equivalent of access_ok(), check_user_copy() is a bit confusing
name IMO.
> so that the actual user-copy routines end up being clean and not have
> #ifdefs in them or any implementation details like what you check
> (stack, slab, page cache - whatever)
>
> If you can also make it automatically not generate any code for cases
> that are somehow obviously safe, then that's an added bonus.
OK, then let's stop on "checks for overflows" and remove the check if
__compiletime_object_size() says something or length is constant. It
should remove most of the checks in fast pathes.
> But my concern is that performance is a real issue, and the strict
> user-copy checking sounds like mostly a "let's enable this for testing
> kernels when chasing some particular issue" feature, the way
> DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is.
I will measure the perfomance penalty tomorrow.
Btw, if the perfomance will be acceptable, what do you think about
logging/reacting on the spotted overflows?
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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