|
Message-ID: <20110703185709.GA7414@albatros> Date: Sun, 3 Jul 2011 22:57:09 +0400 From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, x86@...nel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org Subject: Re: [RFC v1] implement SL*B and stack usercopy runtime checks On Sun, Jul 03, 2011 at 11:27 -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote: > That patch is entirely insane. No way in hell will that ever get merged. Sure, this is just an RFC :) I didn't think about proposing it as a patch as is, I tried to just show how/what checks it introduces. > copy_to/from_user() is some of the most performance-critical code, and > runs a *lot*, often for fairly small structures (ie 'fstat()' etc). > > Adding random ad-hoc tests to it is entirely inappropriate. Doing so > unconditionally is insane. That's why I've asked whether it makes sense to guard it with CONFIG_XXX, defaults to =n. Some distributions might think it makes sense to enable it sacrificing some speed. Will do. > If you seriously clean it up (that at a minimum includes things like > making it configurable using some pretty helper function that just > compiles away for all the normal cases, Hm, it is not as simple as it looks at the first glance - even if the object size is known at the compile time (__compiletime_object_size), it might be a field of a structure, which crosses the slab object boundaries because of an overflow. However, if interpret constants fed to copy_*_user() as equivalent to {get,put}_user() (== worry about size argument overflow only), then it might be useful here. > if (!slab_access_ok(to, n) || !stack_access_ok(to, n)) OK :) Thanks! -- Vasiliy Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.