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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.00.1106202040400.10448@tundra.namei.org>
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2011 20:43:57 +1000 (EST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 2/5 v4] procfs: add hidepid= and gid= mount options
On Mon, 20 Jun 2011, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > Can you provide evidence that this is a useful feature? e.g. examples of
> > exploits / techniques which would be _usefully_ hampered or blocked.
>
> First, most of these files are usefull in sense of statistics gathering
> and debugging. There is no reason to provide this information to the
> world.
>
> Second, yes, it blocks one source of information used in timing attacks,
> just use reading the counters as more or less precise time measurement
> when actual timing measurements are not precise enough.
Can you provide concrete examples?
> > > hidepid=1 means users may not access any /proc/<pid>/ directories, but their
> > > own. Sensitive files like cmdline, io, sched*, status, wchan are now
> > > protected against other users. As permission checking done in
> > > proc_pid_permission() and files' permissions are left untouched,
> > > programs expecting specific files' permissions are not confused.
> >
> > IMHO such programs are beyond broken and have voided their kernel
> > warranty.
>
> Policykit, Debian's start-stop-daemon, util-linux use /proc/PID's uid.
> procps use both /proc/PID's uid and gid. Are all of them totally broken?
If they depend on specific permissions, yes.
To access the information, why not just create a group with Unix read
access to these files?
- James
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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