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Message-ID: <20110620154429.GA12879@albatros> Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2011 19:44:29 +0400 From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> To: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@...onical.com> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, apparmor@...ts.ubuntu.com, "selinux@...ho.nsa.gov Stephen Smalley" <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>, John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, serge@...lyn.com Subject: Re: [RFC v2] security: intoduce ptrace_task_may_access_current On Mon, Jun 20, 2011 at 10:00 -0500, Serge Hallyn wrote: > > >diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c > > >index 283c529..bc9b07f 100644 > > >--- a/kernel/capability.c > > >+++ b/kernel/capability.c > > >@@ -356,6 +356,30 @@ bool capable(int cap) > > > } > > > EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); > > > > > >+bool task_capable(struct task_struct *task, int cap) > > >+{ > > >+ return ns_task_capable(task,&init_user_ns, cap); > > >+} > > >+EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_capable); > > > > Why do we keep adding things like task_capable? Can't we just stop > > adding non-lsm functions and just call the right LSM functions from > > now on? This is my original comments mostly directed at Serge. I'm > > to the point where I want to NAK anything new in kernel/capability.c > > (and yes, I know i'm guilty in the paste) > > > > >+bool ns_task_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) > > Can you just use has_ns_capability() at the places where you wanted to > use your new ns_task_capable()? It won't set PF_SUPERPRIV, but you > can't set that on another task anyway IIRC. has_ns_capability() doesn't touch LSMs, but ns_task_capable() uses security_task_capable() which uses LSMs. Actually, I'm a bit confused in sense of what capable functions should be used in specific cases. Where we need to inform LSM and where not. I don't want to bypass LSMs where it should not do it otherwise. In the patch I've copied alredy existing behaviour leaving LSM iteraction as-is. Thanks, -- Vasiliy Kulikov http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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