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Message-ID: <20110620144035.GB11750@albatros>
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2011 18:40:35 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
apparmor@...ts.ubuntu.com,
"selinux@...ho.nsa.gov Stephen Smalley" <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, serge@...lyn.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v2] security: intoduce ptrace_task_may_access_current
Hi Eric,
On Mon, Jun 20, 2011 at 10:22 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> >diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> >index c421123..cc0bcfe 100644
> >--- a/include/linux/capability.h
> >+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> >@@ -544,7 +544,9 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
> > struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> > extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
> > extern bool capable(int cap);
> >+extern bool task_capable(struct task_struct *task, int cap);
> > extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> >+extern bool ns_task_capable(struct task_struct *t, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
> > extern bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
>
> now we have ns_task_capable() and task_ns_capable() ? What is the
> difference? Why do I have 2? Which one do I choose where?
Hmmm, agreed, I didn't spot it.
> >diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> >index 8ce59ef..fb79dd5 100644
> >--- a/include/linux/security.h
> >+++ b/include/linux/security.h
> >@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ struct user_namespace;
> > extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
> > struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit);
> > extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
> >-extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> >+extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *task, struct task_struct *child,
> >+ unsigned int mode);
> > extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
> > extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
> > extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> >@@ -1375,7 +1376,9 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
> > struct security_operations {
> > char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
> >
> >- int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> >+ int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *task,
> >+ struct task_struct *child,
> >+ unsigned int mode);
>
> formatting nit, this patch lines up args, it doesn't just use tabs
> for the 2nd/3rd line.
OK.
> > int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent);
> > int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
> > kernel_cap_t *effective,
> >@@ -1657,6 +1660,8 @@ extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops);
> > extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
> >
> > /* Security operations */
> >+int security_ptrace_task_access_check(struct task_struct *task,
> >+ struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
>
> I thought we agreed to not add a new ptrace_task_access_check(),
> just fix security_ptrace_access_check() to take the new argument.
I did it for security ops, will do it for security_ptrace_access_check()
too.
> > int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
> > int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
> > int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
> >@@ -1667,6 +1672,10 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> > const kernel_cap_t *effective,
> > const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
> > const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
> >+int security_task_capable(struct task_struct *task,
> >+ struct user_namespace *ns,
> >+ const struct cred *cred,
> >+ int cap);
>
> Personally I don't love this either and think we should just
> redefine security_capable.
OK.
> > int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
> > int cap);
> > int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
> >@@ -1837,10 +1846,16 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> >+static inline int security_ptrace_task_access_check(struct task_struct *task,
> >+ struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
> >+{
> >+ return cap_ptrace_access_check(task, child, mode);
> >+}
> >+
> > static inline int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
> > unsigned int mode)
> > {
> >- return cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
> >+ return cap_ptrace_access_check(current, child, mode);
> > }
>
> Lets not introduce security_ptrace_task_access_check() at all. Just
> add the new argument to security_ptrace_access_check() and fix the
> single caller (it looks to me like security_ptrace_access_check()
> has no users after this patch)
OK.
> >
> > static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
> >@@ -1865,10 +1880,18 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new,
> > return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted);
> > }
> >
> >+static inline int security_task_capable(struct task_struct *task,
> >+ struct user_namespace *ns,
> >+ const struct cred *cred,
> >+ int cap)
> >+{
> >+ return cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> >+}
> >+
> > static inline int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns,
> > const struct cred *cred, int cap)
> > {
> >- return cap_capable(current, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> >+ return security_task_capable(current, ns, cred, cap);
> > }
>
> There is only one caller of security_capable outside in the kernel.
> Can we just add the task argument rather than make a new function?
> Even if you want to retain security_capable, define it exactly like
> this up where you declared the function and remove it everywhere
> else in the code base.
OK.
> > static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> >diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> >index 283c529..bc9b07f 100644
> >--- a/kernel/capability.c
> >+++ b/kernel/capability.c
> >@@ -356,6 +356,30 @@ bool capable(int cap)
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
> >
> >+bool task_capable(struct task_struct *task, int cap)
> >+{
> >+ return ns_task_capable(task,&init_user_ns, cap);
> >+}
> >+EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_capable);
>
> Why do we keep adding things like task_capable? Can't we just stop
> adding non-lsm functions and just call the right LSM functions from
> now on? This is my original comments mostly directed at Serge. I'm
> to the point where I want to NAK anything new in kernel/capability.c
> (and yes, I know i'm guilty in the paste)
>
> >+bool ns_task_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> >+{
> >+ if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
> >+ printk(KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
> >+ BUG();
> >+ }
> >+
> >+ rcu_read_lock();
> >+ if (security_task_capable(task, ns, __task_cred(task), cap) == 0) {
> >+ rcu_read_unlock();
> >+ current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
(fixing my 2 copy-paste bugs, here and below)
s/current/task/
> >+ return true;
> >+ }
> >+ rcu_read_unlock();
> >+ return false;
> >+}
> >+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_task_capable);
>
> Ok, NAK. I just can' stomache having a ns_task_capable() and a
> task_ns_capable(). One of them has to be wrong.
I'm a bit confused with numerous capable funtions too, but I thought
they are needed for some abstraction level. I'll remove ns_task_capable().
> >+
> > /**
> > * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
> > * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
> >@@ -369,16 +393,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
> > */
> > bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> > {
> >- if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
> >- printk(KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
> >- BUG();
> >- }
> >-
> >- if (security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) {
> >- current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> >- return true;
> >- }
> >- return false;
> >+ return ns_task_capable(current, ns, cap);
> > }
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
> >
> >diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
> >index 2df1157..df8fe32 100644
> >--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> >+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
> >@@ -132,9 +132,9 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill)
> > return ret;
> > }
> >
> >-int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> >+int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *who, struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> > {
> >- const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
> >+ const struct cred *cred, *tcred;
> >
> > /* May we inspect the given task?
> > * This check is used both for attaching with ptrace
> >@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> > if (task == current)
s/current/who/
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
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