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Message-ID: <20110612111222.GA23467@p183.telecom.by>
Date: Sun, 12 Jun 2011 14:12:23 +0300
From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Nikanth Karthikesan <knikanth@...e.de>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...e.de>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [RFC] procfs: add hidepid and hidenet modes
On Sun, Jun 12, 2011 at 11:51:01AM +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> hidenet means /proc/PID/net will be accessible to processes with
> CAP_NET_ADMIN capability or to members of a special group.
>
> gid=XXX defines a group that will be able to gather all processes' info
> and network connections info.
>
> Similar features are implemented for old kernels in -ow patches (for
> Linux 2.2 and 2.4) and for Linux 2.6 in -grsecurity (but both of them
> are implemented as configure options, not cofigurable in runtime).
>
>
> In current version hidenet works for CONFIG_NET_NS=y via creating a
> "fake" net namespace and slipping it to nonauthorized users, resulting
> in users observing blank net files (like nobody use the network). If
> CONFIG_NET_NS=n I don't see anything better than just fully denying
> access to /proc/<pid>/net. More elegant ideas are welcome.
This fake netns concept is ugly.
If you wan't deny something, why don't you return -E?
Regardless, these should be separate patch from PID stuff.
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