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Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2024 15:10:42 -0500
From: Mark Esler <mark.esler@...onical.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Security vulnerability in fprintd
At Marco's request, I am asking MITRE to either revoke CVE-2024-37408 or for
MITRE to transfer CVE ownership to Canonical's CNA for revocation.
On Thu, Jun 13, 2024 at 06:40:51PM +0200, Marco Trevisan wrote:
> Hi Yaron,
>
> Thanks for taking time to look into this issue.
>
> We appreciate the analysis you did, although, as we already shared
> privately, we don't think that this is a fprintd issue but rather an
> architectural issue of how PAM modules interact with sudo that, by
> design, does not permit an additional attention mechanism beyond
> displaying a prompt in the terminal.
>
> It's important to note that no graphical PAM front-end (that we are
> aware of) is affected by this problem. For example, the PolicyKit
> dialog that gnome-shell integrates and also the GDM login and lock
> screens will properly ensure user attention. Said differently, there
> should be no user attention issue as long as fingerprint authentication
> is restricted to properly implemented graphical front-ends. This is a
> policy decision for administrators and distributors to ensure using the
> PAM configuration.
>
> We would like to point out that similar behaviors may occur with any
> PAM module that uses an out-of-band authentication mechanism (whether
> using another device or not) that doesn't require the user to pay
> attention to the main device (SSO, web authentication, hardware-token
> based, …).
>
> The discussed behavior completely depends on the PAM configuration
> (which, in most cases, needs to be enabled by the user). If this is
> considered an issue, then it cannot be resolved within fprintd (and
> pam_fprintd.so in particular). Should this be considered an issue, then
> it needs to be addressed by modifying the PAM configuration to restrict
> pam_fprintd.so to front-ends that implement a proper attention
> mechanism. This is out of scope for fprintd and must be done by
> administrators and possibly distributions as part of a policy decision.
> A policy decision that the reporter made when enabling fingerprint
> authentication using pam-auth-update.
>
> As explained, this is not an fprintd issue, and it cannot be considered
> a security flaw in fprintd, and therefore we believe that it should not
> have been assigned a CVE number.
>
> Thank you again for caring about fingerprint security.
>
> The fprintd maintainers,
> Benjamin and Marco
>
>
> Il giorno gio, 30/05/2024 alle 09.18 +0000, Yaron Shahrabani ha
> scritto:
> > Hi everyone, I'm writing to this mailing list since I've already
> > shared the details with Benjamin Berg and Marco Trevisan privately,
> > and we have yet to conclude about this vulnerability.
> > This information was also disclosed to the fprintd mailing list:
> > https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/fprint/2024-May/001231.html
> >
> > My sudo is configured to approve access with pam_fprintd; this is the
> > config file:
> >
> > #%PAM-1.0
> >
> > auth sufficient pam_fprintd.so
> > auth include system-auth
> > account include system-auth
> > session include system-auth
> >
> > So, unless I'm not already authenticated, running the following
> > command:
> > sudo whoami
> > Replies with the following prompt:
> > Place your finger on the fingerprint reader
> >
> > Placing my finger on the fingerprint reader leads to the following
> > output:
> > root
> >
> > The security concern is that this process can also happen behind the
> > scenes, so if I'm running a script that has a sudo prompt to delete
> > something I care about, I can accidentally place my fingerprint on
> > the
> > fingerprint reader for any other reasons, and my beloved files will
> > be
> > removed.
> >
> > How do we recreate the issue?
> > You can open your favorite console app on Linux.
> > If it supports tabs open two tabs, if not just open another window.
> > On the first tab, type: sudo whoami
> > Switch to the second tab and type: echo Place your finger on the
> > fingerprint reader;cat
> > Place your fingerprint on the fingerprint reader
> > Return to the first tab (You should see that the command was approved
> > and the output is root)
> >
> > Assume the user was running some background process and didn't see
> > the
> > fingerprint prompt from the other terminal. The second terminal may
> > deceive the user into placing the finger on the fingerprint reader
> > and
> > elevating permissions without the user being fully aware.
> >
> > On Ubuntu, if I want to recreate the same configuration, all I have
> > to
> > do is enroll my fingerprints in System Settings,
> > then install the pam-auth-update and select the Fingerprint
> > authentication from the selection screen (apt specific) as described
> > in the following SO thread:
> > https://askubuntu.com/questions/1015416/use-fingerprint-authentication-not-only-for-login
> > .
> >
> > This problem was solved in macOS by simply displaying a window; if
> > the
> > window is out of focus, the fingerprint won't work.
> > Since we can't rely on any graphical window on Linux since it can be
> > terminal only, we need to ensure that the user fingerprint is used
> > only for the sole purpose of the request and with full attention to
> > the specific action the fingerprint was requested for. Otherwise, the
> > fingerprint can be hijacked (just like clickjacking).
> >
> > Benjamin was kind enough to respond, and I allowed myself to
> > summarize
> > his reply:
> > It can happen with fprintd as with any other external authentication
> > method (aside from password, we have Bluetooth proximity, NFC Tag,
> > Smart Card, etc.), so it is not unique to fprintd.
> > Benjamin also offered mitigating ways, such as changing the
> > configuration or using pkexec instead of sudo.
> >
> > I addressed this issue with the sudo maintainer, Todd C. Miller, and
> > again, I allowed myself to summarize his response:
> > Although I understand the concern, I need a security attention
> > mechanism to fix it.
> >
> > CVSS 4.0 ranked this CVE as 7.3.
> >
> > Thank you,
> > PS, I'm not a security researcher, and I'm not affiliated with any
> > organization.
> >
> > Yaron Shahrabani - DevOps, Hebrew translator
>
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