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Message-ID: <4b386d20-6b24-427b-ac3f-2098cf402329@citrix.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2023 02:10:59 +0100
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>
To: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com,
"Xen. org security team" <security-team-members@....org>
Subject: Re: Xen Security Advisory 439 v1 (CVE-2023-20588) -
x86/AMD: Divide speculative information leak
On 03/10/2023 9:58 pm, Solar Designer wrote:
> However, this may be another reason to actually look into whether the
> remainder also leaked, and whether the byte-sized form prevents that
> leak despite of it not touching the architectural register where the
> remainder would be stored by a preceding larger DIV. I expect that
> we're fine here - it's the divider unit's internal register and not the
> architectural register that should matter - but worth making sure. It
> could also theoretically be e.g. some buffer registers in the middle,
> where the byte-sized form wouldn't overwrite the full contents.
I've spent a while trying to reason about this... I'm not sure I'm any
the wiser, but here goes.
In order for values to be forwarded to dependent operations, the
register file entries allocated to the answer(s) of the DIV must have
been marked as ready. (i.e. it's not sufficient for it to "just" be
left on the output of the divider because there won't be a special path
sideways to other execute units.)
Furthermore in this case, a real answer from the divider must have
written back, as we're concerned here about the last DIV to have
completed, and not some other stale content which happened to live in
the register file. (The Gather Data Sampling vulnerability from the
same deadline is an example of a vector register being marked as good
before it has been completely overwritten, hence the leaking of stale
content.)
There are two sources of #DE. A divide by 0, or result out of range.
A sane implementation of a hardware divider isn't going to multiply the
numerator and denominator to evaluate result out of range, when it can
just look for a carry/overflow on the final iteration. On the other
hand, checking for 0 has to be done first because the result of the
operation is nonsensical otherwise. Indeed, this is exactly how the
8086 did it[1].
So the practical results of the divider are either a failure at the
start (which is div0) or a result at the end (which is either success,
or out-of-range).
Viewed from this perspective, it's perhaps easy to see why the div0 case
passes the prior result (i.e. nothing mutated the buffer), whereas all
other cases have put a result (correct or otherwise) into buffer before
signalling a completion of the instruction.
Either way, it's just speculation for now, and we all know how dangerous
that can be...
~Andrew
[1]
https://www.righto.com/2023/04/reverse-engineering-8086-divide-microcode.html
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