[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <49483cca.b2ec2.18914ae1e88.Coremail.linma@zju.edu.cn>
Date: Sun, 2 Jul 2023 11:38:22 +0800 (GMT+08:00)
From: "Lin Ma" <linma@....edu.cn>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: CVE-2023-3439: Linux MCTP use-after-free in mctp_sendmsg
Hello,
We have found a concurrency use-after-free case in Linux kernel and assigned with CVE-2023-3439 by Red Hat Team.
Below is the details about this issue.
=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*= Details =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=
bug fix patch (upstream):
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b561275d633b
bug introduce commit:
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/583be982d934
required privilege:
CAP_NET_ADMIN
crash stack:
[ 86.051955] ==================================================================
[ 86.051955] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mctp_local_output+0x4e9/0xb7d
[ 86.051955] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888005f298c0 by task poc/295
[ 86.051955]
[ 86.051955] Call Trace:
[ 86.051955] <TASK>
[ 86.051955] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x42
[ 86.051955] print_report.cold.13+0xb2/0x6b3
[ 86.051955] ? preempt_schedule_irq+0x57/0x80
[ 86.051955] ? mctp_local_output+0x4e9/0xb7d
[ 86.051955] kasan_report+0xa5/0x120
[ 86.051955] ? mctp_local_output+0x4e9/0xb7d
[ 86.051955] mctp_local_output+0x4e9/0xb7d
[ 86.051955] ? mctp_dev_set_key+0x79/0x79
[ 86.051955] ? copyin+0x38/0x50
[ 86.051955] ? _copy_from_iter+0x1b6/0xf20
[ 86.051955] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x97/0xb0
[ 86.051955] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
[ 86.051955] ? mctp_local_output+0x1/0xb7d
[ 86.051955] mctp_sendmsg+0x64d/0xdb0
[ 86.051955] ? mctp_sk_close+0x20/0x20
[ 86.051955] ? __fget_light+0x2fd/0x4f0
[ 86.051955] ? mctp_sk_close+0x20/0x20
[ 86.051955] sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x110
[ 86.051955] __sys_sendto+0x1cc/0x2a0
[ 86.051955] ? __ia32_sys_getpeername+0xa0/0xa0
[ 86.051955] ? new_sync_write+0x335/0x550
[ 86.051955] ? alloc_file+0x22f/0x500
[ 86.051955] ? __ip_do_redirect+0x820/0x1820
[ 86.051955] ? vfs_write+0x44d/0x7b0
[ 86.051955] ? vfs_write+0x44d/0x7b0
[ 86.051955] ? fput_many+0x15/0x120
[ 86.051955] ? ksys_write+0x155/0x1b0
[ 86.051955] ? __ia32_sys_read+0xa0/0xa0
[ 86.051955] __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0
[ 86.051955] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2f/0x120
[ 86.051955] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x20
[ 86.051955] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ 86.051955] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 86.051955] RIP: 0033:0x7f82118a56b3
[ 86.051955] RSP: 002b:00007ffdb154b110 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 86.051955] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f82118a56b3
[ 86.051955] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00007f8211cd4000 RDI: 0000000000000007
[ 86.051955] RBP: 00007ffdb154c1d0 R08: 00007ffdb154b164 R09: 000000000000000c
[ 86.051955] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000055d779800db0
[ 86.051955] R13: 00007ffdb154c2b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 86.051955] </TASK>
[ 86.051955]
[ 86.051955] Allocated by task 295:
[ 86.051955] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 86.051955] __kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0
[ 86.051955] mctp_rtm_newaddr+0x242/0x610
[ 86.051955] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2fd/0x8b0
[ 86.051955] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11c/0x340
[ 86.051955] netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
[ 86.051955] netlink_sendmsg+0x752/0xc00
[ 86.051955] sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x110
[ 86.051955] __sys_sendto+0x1cc/0x2a0
[ 86.051955] __x64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0x1b0
[ 86.051955] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[ 86.051955] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 86.051955]
[ 86.051955] Freed by task 301:
[ 86.051955] kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 86.051955] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
[ 86.051955] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
[ 86.051955] __kasan_slab_free+0x104/0x170
[ 86.051955] kfree+0x8c/0x290
[ 86.051955] mctp_dev_notify+0x161/0x2c0
[ 86.051955] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x8b/0xc0
[ 86.051955] unregister_netdevice_many+0x299/0x1180
[ 86.051955] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x210/0x2f0
[ 86.051955] unregister_netdev+0x13/0x20
[ 86.051955] mctp_serial_close+0x6d/0xa0
[ 86.051955] tty_ldisc_kill+0x31/0xa0
[ 86.051955] tty_ldisc_hangup+0x24f/0x560
[ 86.051955] __tty_hangup.part.28+0x2ce/0x6b0
[ 86.051955] tty_release+0x327/0xc70
[ 86.051955] __fput+0x1df/0x8b0
[ 86.051955] task_work_run+0xca/0x150
[ 86.051955] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x114/0x120
[ 86.051955] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x20
[ 86.051955] do_syscall_64+0x46/0x80
[ 86.051955] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 86.051955]
[ 86.051955] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888005f298c0
[ 86.051955] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
[ 86.051955] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
[ 86.051955] 8-byte region [ffff888005f298c0, ffff888005f298c8)
[ 86.051955]
[ 86.051955] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 86.051955] flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1)
[ 86.051955] raw: 0100000000000200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888005c42280
[ 86.051955] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080660066 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 86.051955] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 86.051955]
[ 86.051955] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 86.051955] ffff888005f29780: 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00
[ 86.051955] ffff888005f29800: fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc
[ 86.051955] >ffff888005f29880: fc fc fc fb fc fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fc fa fc fc
[ 86.051955] ^
[ 86.051955] ffff888005f29900: fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc
[ 86.051955] ffff888005f29980: fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc
[ 86.051955] ==================================================================
root cause:
Just like the CVE-2021-3573, this bug occurs when a malicious user fakes a MCTP device and issues
sendmsg syscall when closing the device. By using userfaultfd, this bug can be stably triggered.
As the bug fix possibly self-explantory, please to refer to the above link for more details.
PoC code:
please see attachment.
=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*= Credit =*=*=*=*=*=*=*=*=
Lin Ma (@f0rm2l1n) from ZheJiang University & Ant Group Light-Year Security Lab
Download attachment "attachment.zip" of type "application/zip" (7318 bytes)
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
