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Message-ID: <YQ7OO1DgWDwm7vvy@eldamar.lan>
Date: Sat, 7 Aug 2021 20:17:31 +0200
From: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@...ian.org>
To: Axel Beckert <abe@...ian.org>, 991971@...s.debian.org
Cc: lynx-dev@...gnu.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com,
security@...ian.org
Subject: Re: Bug#991971: [Lynx-dev] bug in Lynx' SSL certificate validation
-> leaks password in clear text via SNI (under some circumstances)
Hi Axel,
On Sat, Aug 07, 2021 at 03:51:07AM +0200, Axel Beckert wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Fri, Aug 06, 2021 at 05:14:32PM +0000, Thorsten Glaser
> <tg@...bsd.de> wrote in
> https://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/lynx-dev/2021-08/msg00000.html:
> > this affects both OpenSSL and Debian’s nonGNUtls builds:
> >
> > lynx https://user:pass@...t/
> >
> > … will lead to…
> >
> > SSL error:host(user:pass@...t)!=cert(CN<mainhost>:SAN<DNS=host>:SAN<DNS=otherhost>
> >
> > … for OpenSSL lynx and…
> >
> > SSL error:host(user:pass@...t)!=cert(CN<mainhost>)-Continue? (n)
> >
> > … for nonGNUtls lynx.
> >
> > Obviously, user:pass@ need to be stripped before comparing.
>
> This is more severe than it initially looked like: Due to TLS Server
> Name Indication (SNI) the hostname as parsed by Lynx (i.e with
> "user:pass@" included) is sent in _clear_ text over the wire even
> _before_ I can even said "n" for "no, don't continue to talk with this
> server" in Lynx's prompt as shown above.
>
> I was able to capture the password given on the commandline in traffic
> of an TLS handshake using tcpdump and analysing it with Wireshark:
>
> From Wiresharks TLS dissector:
>
> Server Name Indication extension
> Server Name list length: 28
> Server Name Type: host_name (0)
> Server Name length: 25
> Server Name: user:pass@....example.org
> ^^^^^^^^^^
>
> From Wiresharks "Follow TCP stream":
>
> ...........a
> ....jV.. ......../.......D.&....R.+.,..... .
> .../.0...............z.{./.5.A...
> .....|.}.3.9.E.............2.8.D.......p............$."...user:pass@....example.org......#...
> ...
> .................
> ..............................
>
> (PCAPs available on request. Actually did the test with a local server
> of mine. But it should be easy to reproduce, be it with any Linux
> distribution.)
>
> I did this test with Lynx from Debian Experimental (which has the
> current Lynx upstream release 2.9.0dev.8) as well as with Lynx from
> Debian 8 Jessie ELTS (which has Lynx 2.8.9dev.1) and both leak the
> password via SNI. I though assume that older releases of Lynx are
> probably also affected as well, at least if they or the according
> crypto libraries support SNI.
>
> But given that the symptoms Thorsten discovered stayed unreported for
> quite some years, I assume that this use case is a rather seldom one.
> Nevertheless only trying to use Lynx that way (and seeing it fail)
> already leaks the used password.
>
> IMHO this nevertheless needs a CVE-ID.
MITRE did assign CVE-2021-38165. MITRE raised the question: Does
2.9.0dev.9 (mentioned on the
https://lynx.invisible-island.net/current/CHANGES.html page) fix the
entire problem?
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/08/07/7 claims that
credentials appear in the HTTP Host header to an http:// (i.e.,
non-SSL) website.
Regards,
Salvatore
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