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Message-ID: <20200128235022.GA30755@openwall.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2020 00:50:22 +0100
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: Linux kernel: user-triggerable read-after-free crash or 1-bit infoleak oracle in open(2)

On Tue, Jan 28, 2020 at 10:48:10PM +0100, Solar Designer wrote:
> I intend to request a CVE ID and post it as a follow-up to this thread.

"Use CVE-2020-8428."

> Al Viro found and analyzed the security impact of and fixed a bug in
> Linux 4.19+ where open(2)'s eventual call to may_create_in_sticky() was
> "done when we already have dropped the reference to dir" and thus with
> dir (a "struct dentry" pointer) being potentially stale and potentially
> pointing to reused memory.

> The bug was introduced with commit 30aba6656f61 and first included in
> Linux 4.19.  Al fixed it with commit d0cb50185ae9 two days ago, and the
> fix is already in Linux 5.5 and Greg KH is getting it into stable.

Alexander

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