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Message-ID: <CAEoRBew=EvETjHzcQVbUGKmqxJ5BnghbJ-C=vejjaa0XB4Sn1g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Nov 2019 09:26:50 -0800
From: Tim Armstrong <tarmstrong@...che.org>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: [CVE-2019-10084] privilege escalation by authenticated Apache Impala users
CVE-2019-10084: privilege escalation by authenticated Apache Impala users
Severity: High
Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation
Versions Affected: Impala 2.7.0 to Impala 3.2.0
Description: An authenticated user with access to the IDs of active Impala
queries or sessions can interact with those sessions or queries via a
specially-constructed request and thereby potentially bypass authorization
and audit mechanisms.
Session and query IDs are unique and random, but have not been documented
or consistently treated as sensitive secrets. Therefore they may be exposed
in logs or interfaces. They were also not generated with a
cryptographically secure random number generator, so are vulnerable to
random number generator attacks that predict future IDs based on past IDs.
Impala deployments with Apache Sentry or Apache Ranger authorization
enabled may be vulnerable to privilege escalation if an authenticated
attacker is able to hijack a session or query from another authenticated
user with privileges not assigned to the attacker.
Impala deployments with audit logging enabled may be vulnerable to
incorrect audit logging as a user could undertake actions that were logged
under the name of a different authenticated user.
Constructing an attack requires a high degree of technical sophistication
and access to the Impala system as an authenticated user.
Mitigation: If an Impala deployment uses Apache Sentry, Apache Ranger or
audit logging, then users should upgrade to a version of Impala with the
fix for IMPALA-8605. The Impala 3.3.0 release includes this fix. This
implements session secrets that eliminate the risk of any attack using this
mechanism.
In lieu of an upgrade, restricting access to debug pages, administrative
interfaces and logs that expose session and query IDs will reduce but not
eliminate the risk of an attack. Restricting access to the Impala
deployment to trusted users will also reduce the risk of an attack
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