[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAOTQaXHLe6ST5SOQhH_hig1KD9UyhzMUvr4iXiJz5szm5hsUow@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Jun 2016 17:15:59 +0200
From: Gsunde Orangen <gsunde.orangen@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE-2016-2178: OpenSSL DSA follows a non-constant
time codepath for certain operations
Whilst there is a commit in openssl and a CVE ID, I wonder why this hasn't
been announced yet by OpenSSL.org and why there are no official fix
releases (yet).
What made this issue different to the usual coordinated disclosures being
practiced with the OpenSSL team?
2016-06-08 10:54 GMT+02:00 Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>:
> Hi,
>
> Just off Twitter:
>
> <mjos_crypto> Out today: This is the OpenSSL side-channel vulnerability I
> mentioned last week; now on ePrint. Also CVE-2016-2178.
> http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/594
> <@mjos_crypto> @mjos_crypto Currently unfixed in essentially all distros.
> <mjos_crypto> Note that CVE-2016-2178 /
> http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/594.pdf most severely actually impacts
> OpenSSH, which uses the OpenSSL library.
> <mjos_crypto> Cesar's CVE-2016-2178 patch for the OpenSSL library from
> Monday.
> https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2
>
> http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/594
>
> | "Make Sure DSA Signing Exponentiations Really are Constant-Time''
> |
> | Cesar Pereida Garca and Billy Bob Brumley and Yuval Yarom
> |
> | Abstract: TLS and SSH are two of the most commonly used protocols for
> securing Internet traffic. Many of the implementations of these protocols
> rely on the cryptographic primitives provided in the OpenSSL library. In
> this work we disclose a vulnerability in OpenSSL, affecting all versions
> and forks (e.g. LibreSSL and BoringSSL) since roughly October 2005, which
> renders the implementation of the DSA signature scheme vulnerable to
> cache-based side-channel attacks. Exploiting the software defect, we
> demonstrate the first published cache-based key-recovery attack on these
> protocols: 260 SSH-2 handshakes to extract a 1024/160-bit DSA host key from
> an OpenSSH server, and 580 TLS 1.2 handshakes to extract a 2048/256-bit DSA
> key from an stunnel server.
> |
> | Category / Keywords: applied cryptography; digital signatures;
> side-channel analysis; timing attacks; cache-timing attacks; DSA; OpenSSL;
> CVE-2016-2178
> |
> | Date: received 6 Jun 2016, last revised 7 Jun 2016
>
>
> https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=399944622df7bd81af62e67ea967c470534090e2
>
> | author Cesar Pereida
> | Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300 (12:45 +0300)
> | committer Matt Caswell
> | Mon, 6 Jun 2016 13:08:15 +0300 (11:08 +0100)
>
> | Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
> |
> | Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
> | order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
> | implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
> | certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
> | attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
> |
> | CVE-2016-2178
>
> Alexander
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
